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ABSTRACT  
The Canadian Arctic is facing new international challenges as global warming melts 
Arctic ice, opening up new shipping routes and access to untapped, potentially rich resources.  
As it has in the past, Canada is turning to defense spending to help strengthen its sovereignty in 
the region. Sovereignty is a multi-dimensional concept which requires a state to demonstrate 
control over its territory and its citizens. Developing Arctic energy resources is one pathway for 
Canada to achieve greater control in the region and strengthen its sovereignty claim.  
This thesis considers realist and liberal policy approaches to the development of Canada’s 
Arctic energy resources. In the past, Canada has used both approaches to encourage the 
development of its Arctic energy reserves. From the 1950s to the early 1970s Canada relied 
solely on private companies to explore and produce Arctic resources. Between 1975 and 1984 
Canada took a more interventionist approach. In 1975, Petro-Canada was created to help 
stimulate the development of Arctic resources. One of Petro-Canada’s primary goals was to act 
as a catalyst for private energy companies operating in the Arctic. 
This thesis seeks to expand upon the literature discussing Canadian Arctic sovereignty. 
By examining the impact of the two energy approaches on state sovereignty, this study draws a 
series of conclusion about the role of energy development in improving Canada’s sovereignty 
claim. This thesis argues that government intervention is required to develop working 
partnerships amongst Canadian oil producers in order to bring Arctic energy reserves online in a 
timely and efficient manner to help bolster Canada’s sovereignty claim. 
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1.1  Background 
After many years on the sidelines, the contentious issue of Canadian Arctic sovereignty is 
returning to the political spotlight. In the last decade, Canada’s concern for the region has grown 
considerably. The need to strengthen Canada’s sovereignty claim has taken on a new sense of 
urgency as the polar ice thaws, creating new shipping routes and allowing access to resources 
previously unavailable. The receding polar ice is creating new economic opportunities while 
imposing new security challenges. Other circumpolar nations are actively challenging Canada’s 
sovereignty in the region.  
There are a number of factors that help to illustrate why Canada’s sovereignty in the 
Arctic is being challenged. First, Canada’s Northern territories are sparsely populated. In 2009, 
Statistics Canada estimated that only 104,000 people live in the Yukon, Northwest Territories 
and Nunavut (Statistics Canada, 2009). The low level of population in the Canadian North 
undermines the Canadian claim to the region.  
Second, global warming is opening up new transportation routes in Canada’s northern 
seaways. The opening up of new waters through the Northwest Passage is particularly 
controversial. Ships that normally pass through the Panama Canal to transfer goods between the 
Pacific and Atlantic Ocean will soon be able to navigate through the Northwest Passage (Stoicof, 
2008: 33). For example, an oil tanker travelling from Europe to Asia using the Panama Canal has 
to travel a distance of approximately 13,000 nautical miles. If that ship were to use the Northwest 
Passage it would only have to travel roughly 8,500 nautical miles (Mifflin, 2007: 55). As Arctic 
ice melts pressure to utilize new shipping routes, such as the Northwest Passage, will increase.  
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Third, a number of outstanding territorial disputes are undermining Canada’s claim to the 
Arctic including the status of the Northwest Passage, the dispute over Hans Island and the 
Kennedy Channel, the maritime boundary between Alaska and the Yukon border in the Beaufort 
Sea, and perhaps most importantly, Canada’s Arctic continental shelf boundary.  Fourth, the lack 
of infrastructure for development threatens Canada’s future prosperity in the region. For 
example, the territory of Nunavut, which spans 1,994,000 square kilometers or approximately 20 
percent of the total Canadian land mass, has only one government-maintained road running 21 
kilometers from Arctic Bay to Nanisivik. Roads are only one aspect of the total infrastructure 
requirement but they do demonstrate the state of infrastructure in the North. The very limited 
infrastructure in the region ultimately threatens the governments’ ability to control the region. 
The government is therefore justifiably concerned about sovereignty.  
Perhaps the greatest challenge to Canada’s sovereignty claim is the commonly held 
perception that insufficient resources and personnel have been dedicated to the region. The lack 
of infrastructure coupled with the fact that Canada has “no central institution or forum for the 
determination of national priorities for the circumpolar North” undermines Canada claim to the 
region (Griffiths, 2008: 3).  Despite these concerns, the Canadian government has largely 
reinforced the idea of sovereignty by force.  
Historically, Canada has turned to the Canadian Forces to reinforce its sovereignty in the 
Arctic (Lakenbauer, 2008: 1). Canada’s major military presence in the North is headquartered in 
Yellowknife. The Canadian Forces Joint Task Force has over 3,500 military personnel who are 
changed with the task of patrolling the North.  While this military presence in the North certainly 
helps to bolster Canada’s claim to the Arctic, the sole application of military power alone does 
not suffice to fulfill all of the requirements of sovereignty (Huebert, 2005: 24).  
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Enhancing sovereignty involves more than simply placing a military presence in the 
region. Sovereignty is a multi-dimensional concept which requires a state to demonstrate control 
over its territory (Krasner, 1999: 10). One means of strengthening state sovereignty is through 
effective occupation which is accomplished by a visible and continuous presence of the state. In 
many parts of the Canadian North, effective occupation and administration are lacking. Asserting 
Arctic sovereignty means having the ability to promote economic development, while protecting 
the environment and health of Canada’s Arctic citizens (Mifflin, 2007: 15). Canada’s control of 
the region is directly related to the prosperity of its northern citizens. If Canada is to strengthen 
its sovereignty claim, it needs to close the standard of living gap between northern and southern 
Canadians. Energy developments can provide opportunities for economic growth which in turn 
can raise the standard of living for Northern Canadians and bolster Canada’s claim to the region. 
 The Canadian Arctic has enormous natural resource potential but significant challenges 
stand in the way of developing these resources. Private investors have been reluctant to invest in 
energy projects in the Canadian Arctic due to the high cost and high risk associated with non-
conventional energy development.  In the past, the Canadian government has intervened in the 
oil industry through a national oil company (NOC) in order to promote the development of 
Arctic resources. This type of state intervention is not unique to Canada. Of the five Arctic 
states, three rely on state-run oil companies to explore and produce hydro-carbon resources in the 
Arctic.  Norway, Russia, and Greenland all use NOCs as policy tools to develop off-shore 
resources on their continental shelves.  The use of state-run oil companies has been instrumental 
in developing non-conventional projects in the Arctic.  
 Developing non-conventional energy resources offers a number of benefits to the 
Canadian government and the people of the North and is one means to improve Canada’s 
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sovereignty claim. Since the mid-1980s, Canada has relied on a liberal energy policy to develop 
its Northern resources. In relying solely on private energy companies, the government has let the 
market determine what areas are to be explored for energy resources and what projects are to be 
developed. Over the past two decades private sector developments have been slow, although 
interest in the region is growing. Private energy companies have been reluctant to invest the large 
amount of resources and capital needed to develop energy in the Arctic. The question then, is 
how can the Canadian government encourage the development of these resources? What role 
should the state play in encouraging the development of these resources?  
1.2  Focus, Objectives, and Research Questions  
This thesis examines the issue of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic focusing on energy 
developments as a means to bolster Canada’s claim to the region. In  order  to  do so,  this  thesis  
seeks  to  address  the  following  questions: 
A.) Can Canada sustain/bolster its claim to the Arctic using a liberal approach to energy 
development?  
B.) To what extent does the state have to be involved in energy development to improve 
Canada’s sovereignty claim?  
The objective of this thesis is to examine how energy developments can improve 
Canada’s sovereignty claim in the North. This thesis argues that government intervention is 
required to develop working partnerships amongst Canadian oil producers in order to bring 
Arctic energy reserves online in a timely and efficient manner to help bolster Canada’s 
sovereignty claim. Due to the high risk and high cost associated with developing Arctic 
resources, the Canadian government necessarily has to be involved in the development of these 
resources. At an absolute minimum, the state will have to provide private companies with large 
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scale subsidies in order to encourage development in the Canadian Arctic. However, this does 
not require direct intervention in the form of a national oil company. The government can direct 
investment through other means to help foster economic development and encourage the creation 
of new infrastructure in the Canadian North.  
1.3  Organization of the Thesis  
 In addition to the introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis includes four chapters. 
Each chapter has a specific aim and is used to inform the subsequent chapters. 
 Chapter Two, Defining Sovereignty, examines the issue of state sovereignty using a 
model proposed by the international relations specialist, Stephen Krasner. Krasner suggests that 
sovereignty is composed of four separate and distinct meanings. This chapter will examine each 
type of sovereignty separately. The purpose of this chapter is to identify what can be done to 
strengthen Canada’s sovereignty claim. 
Chapter Three, Approaches to Energy Development, examines the policy pathways 
governments adopt towards developing energy. Using two models situated in the literature 
dealing with International Political Economy, the chapter examines the liberal and realist 
approaches to developing energy. The main purpose of this chapter is identifying which policy 
approach is most likely to improve sovereignty by increasing control in the North.  
 Chapter Four, Comparing Energy Approaches, examines the energy approaches adopted 
by two Arctic states, Norway and Russia, looking for similarities with and alternatives to the 
Canadian approach. These two cases have been selected based on their ability to shed light on 
the impact of energy policy on Arctic sovereignty.  These countries have unique energy 
development models with varying degrees of state control, making them ideal for comparison 
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against the Canadian approach. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight how the policy 
approach has impacted state sovereignty in the North.  
Chapter Five, Canadian Energy Policy and Sovereignty, examines Canada’s approach to 
developing energy in the North, focusing on the role of the state in encouraging private sector 
investment. The purpose of this chapter is to examine Canada’s approach to developing energy 
in the frontier areas. The chapter ends with a discussion how Canada can use energy 
development to improve its sovereignty claim.  
1.4  Contribution of the Thesis  
This thesis will contribute to the discourse on the contentious issue of Arctic sovereignty. 
It will provide an in-depth analysis of Canada’s sovereignty claim in the North.  It advocates 
adopting an interventionist approach to energy development in the Canadian Arctic in order to 
strengthen state sovereignty. The goal of this thesis is to expand the discussion on Arctic 
sovereignty to include energy development as a means to improve Canada’s claim to the region.  
1.5  Methodology  
The information used in this thesis is derived from both primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources include government documents, reports from non-governmental 
organizations, and think tanks reports. Secondary sources have been used to provide context for 
analyzing primary sources. This thesis uses the model of state sovereignty proposed by the Dr. 
Stephen Krasner to analyze Canada’s sovereignty claim in the North. It also uses two models 
prevalent in International Political Economy, in its discussion and analysis on Arctic energy 
policy.  
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Many of the documents used in this study were accessed via the internet. The use of web 
sources was an important component of the research as the majority of primary sources used in 






The definition of sovereignty is somewhat ambiguous. Its meaning is complex and has 
changed over time as multiple definitions have arisen to explain the many approaches states have 
taken towards sovereignty. It relates to issues of control, authority, and perception (Carnaghan 
and Goody, 2006: 3). However, there exists no universal agreement on exactly what sovereignty 
is, or how a state can strengthen its sovereignty. As the international legal scholar Lassa 
Oppenheim observes, “there exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more 
controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the 
moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a 
meaning which was universally agreed upon” (Oppenheim, 1992: 102).  
 The absence of a clear definition makes any discussion regarding sovereignty difficult but 
not impossible. In order to understand sovereignty, the varying definitions need to be unpacked 
and examined to highlight the key components. This chapter examines state sovereignty by using 
a framework proposed by the international relations specialist, Stephen Krasner. In his book, 
Organized Hypocrisy, Krasner suggests sovereignty is composed of four separate and distinct 
meanings. The four types of sovereignty are domestic, independence, international legal and 
Westphalian sovereignty. He argues that “embedded in these four usages of the term is a 
fundamental distinction between authority and control” (Krasner, 1999: 10). Each type of 
sovereignty is exercised in a different manner which relates to these two concepts.  
The purpose of this chapter is identifying how Canada can strengthen its sovereignty 
claim. This chapter argues that Canada should focus on improving its control of the region by 
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fostering economic development and building new infrastructure. The ability to demonstrate 
control can serve to improve domestic and interdependence sovereignty, which in turn can alter 
the perception of other states and increase Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. As 
the state has direct control over domestic sovereignty, this should be the main area in which 
Canada focuses on in terms of strengthening its sovereignty. 
 In order to improve its control of the region, Canada needs to adopt a broader approach to 
sovereignty which centers on improving domestic sovereignty.  This approach should include 
state support for economic development and the building of new infrastructure for commercial 
use. Much of the current discussion on Canadian sovereignty is concerned primarily with 
security issues and the need to increase the government’s presence in the region via the Armed 
Forces. However, the sole of application military power serves only to increase interdependence 
sovereignty and does little in the way of improving domestic sovereignty. While this military 
presence in the North certainly helps to strengthen Canada’s claim to the Arctic, it is not the only 
means of doing so. In the case of Canada, small improvements, such as the development of oil 
and gas reserves translate into improved sovereignty in the long run. 
2.2 Authority and Control 
States exercise sovereignty through control and authority. Control can be gained through 
coercion and force, while authority must be legitimated. Control can be understood as a 
government achieving its will through force, whereas authority is something gained over time 
(Krasner, 1999: 9-10). Kraner defines authority as “a mutually recognized right for an actor to 
engage in specific activities” (Krasner, 1999: 10). When authority is complete the government 
may never have to resort to force to demonstrate its control (Krasner, 1999: 10). However, 
exercising authority requires a small degree of control in order to be effective.  
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Kranser suggests that “a loss of control over a long period of time could lead to a loss of 
authority” (Krasner, 1999: 11). If the state is unable to control its territory and population, it 
could result in a decline in its authority. On the other hand, “the effective exercise of control, or 
the acceptance of a rule for purely instrumental reasons, could generate new systems of 
authority” (1999: 11). In other words, if a government is able to control a territory for a long 
period of time, it could result in the gradual acceptance of its claim to that territory. For Canada, 
this means if the government can demonstrate control of the region for a lengthy period of time it 
could result in the gradual recognition of Canada’s sovereignty in the region.   
Each of the four types of sovereignty deals with authority and control separately. Both 
Westphalian and International Legal sovereignty refer to authority as providing legitimacy to the 
state to act in international affairs. Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public 
officials to control and regulate the movements of goods, people, capital etc. across state borders 
while domestic sovereignty refers to both authority and control (Krasner, 1999: 5). 
It is important to note that the loss of one type of sovereignty does not necessarily imply 
a loss of the others. Similarly a loss of control does not necessarily mean a loss of authority.  The 
loss of interdependence sovereignty generally translates into a loss of domestic control but not 
necessarily mean a loss of domestic authority. Take for example Canada’s 1969 sovereignty 
crisis, when the U.S oil tanker Manhattan traveled through Canada’s internal waters. This 
incident demonstrated a clear inability to control this water way but did not represent a loss of 
authority, as the Canadian government responded by passing environmental legislation 
regulating the passage of marine traffic in the area (Bankes, 1987: 291). This is a good example 
of the distinction between the two terms. While Canada’s authority to regulate its coastal waters 
was assumed, its ability to actually control these waters was lacking.  
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In part, this distinction between authority and control explains why the Canadian 
government has opted to strengthen its interdependence sovereignty through military exercises 
and patrols in the region, and why, improvements in this type of control have little or no bearing 
on Westphalian and International legal sovereignty. More will said on this in the next few pages 
as the key elements of each type of sovereignty are examined. Table 2.2 provides a summary of 




Sovereignty Summary  
 
Sovereignty Type: Authority: Control: 
Domestic 
Concerned with how public 
authority is organized. What 
authority structures are recognized 
in a state?  
Examines the level of effective 
control by those holding 
authority.  How effective is the 
level of control?  
Interdependence Not concerned with authority. 
Exclusively concerned about 
the ability of state to control 
what comes across it borders. 
Can a state control movement 
across its own borders? 
International 
Legal 
Authority is given to territorial 
entries with judicial independence. 
Is the state recognized as having the 
authority to engage in international 
agreements? 
Not concerned with control. 
Westphalian 
Concerned with the exclusion of 
external actors from the affairs of 
the state. Does the state have the 
ability to exclude external actors?  
Not concerned with control. 
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2.3 Domestic Sovereignty 
Initial definitions of sovereignty attempted to legitimize the idea that rulers had sovereign 
rights to govern their territories. Early political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, attempted 
to provide a rationale for one sole and final source of authority within the state (Krasner, 1999: 
11). The contemporary definition refers to the effectiveness of political authorities within the 
borders of a state (Baylis and Smith, 2004: 46). Krasner’s definition follows this pattern; he 
describes domestic sovereignty as “the formal political authority within the state and the ability 
of political authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity” 
(Krasner, 1999: 3-4).  
One important component of domestic sovereignty is that the form of political 
organization or type of political policy it adopts is independent of the other types of sovereignty. 
Kranser suggests that “polities can be organized in many different ways without raising any 
issues for either international legal or Westphalian sovereignty” (Krasner, 1999: 11).  For 
example, a country may exercise very limited control over drug use without affecting its ability 
to exclude external actors from interfering in the domestic political affairs.  Several states, such 
as Portugal, have decriminalized the use of drugs but are still fully recognized as sovereign 
states.  Any impact domestic sovereignty might have on Westphalian or international legal 
sovereignty depends on the reaction of the international community, which is generally based on 
how that government treats its own citizens, and more importantly on the self-interest of other 
more powerful states (Krasner, 1999: 12).  
Domestic authority is gained when the population of a state places their trust in the 
government in return for protection and certain economic and other forms of regulation. 
Domestic sovereignty can serve to improve the other areas of sovereignty by increasing 
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government control and authority.  For Canada, the more the state is able to provide for its 
Northern residents, the greater the government’s control will be. This is also the primary area in 
which energy developments can be used to increase the government’s control of the region by 
fostering economic development and building new infrastructure.  
2.4 Interdependence Sovereignty 
Interdependence sovereignty refers to “the ability of public authorities to control 
transborder movements” (Krasner, 1999: 9). The ability to control who and what comes across 
domestic borders is important for governments and has become more difficult to control with 
improvements in transportation and communications technologies. This had led a number of 
international relations scholars to assert that sovereignty is being eroded by globalization. 
Krasner suggests that these analysts are primarily concerned with questions of control but not 
authority (Krasner, 1999: 12).  The increasing interdependence of states has not stopped 
governments from pursuing national policy agendas, nor has it prevented states from exercising 
state control where warranted.  
As noted above, interdependence sovereignty is primarily concerned with control. In the 
Canadian context, this means control over what comes in and out of the Canadian border. In 
order to effectively control what comes into Canada from its Northern seaways, the Canadian 
government will have to clearly define its borders and put in place a system capable of regulating 
marine traffic and preventing violations to Canadian interdependence sovereignty.  Failure to do 
so will negatively impact Canada’s domestic sovereignty.  
 In order for Canada to limit its loss of interdependence sovereignty greater control is 
needed in the North. The infrastructure needed to control the movement of goods and people is 
currently lacking in the Canadian Arctic. As the Arctic ice melts, ports like the one at Churchill 
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will likely see an increase in the volume of goods coming through the port (Huebert, 2005: 21). 
Without proper control over what comes through these ports Canada will see a decline in its 
interdependence sovereignty and consequently a decline in its domestic sovereignty.  
2.5 International Legal Sovereignty 
This type of sovereignty generally refers to the authority of a state to act in the 
international arena as the sole authority. Krasner defines it as “the practices associated with 
mutual recognition usually between territorial entities that have former jurisdictional 
interdependence” (Krasner, 1999: 3-4). International legal sovereignty is primarily concerned 
with “establishing the status of a political entity in the international system” (Krasner, 1999: 14). 
This type of sovereignty is embedded in international law, which is composed of a series of 
treaties and norms that attempt to regulate the behavior of states in the international system.  
A key consideration is that international law is more malleable than other systems of law 
(Chomsky, 2003: 201). Take for example the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where rulings 
are binding only on parties that have submitted their case before the court. Parties that have not 
agreed to settle an issue in the ICJ are not bound by any ruling made in the court; because of this 
a country like Canada cannot be taken to court without first agreeing to settle the dispute in court 
(Aust, 2005: 5).  
 Arguably, powerful states follow international law only to the extent that it does not 
threaten their interests. If the law is restrictive to the interests of powerful states, it is of little 
consequence to simply ignore the law.  Consider the international terrorism case taken to the ICJ 
by Nicaragua against the United States.  The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua, stating that the 
U.S. had violated international law by supporting the Contra guerrillas in their violent struggle 
against the Nicaraguan government. The U.S. rejected the court’s decision stating the court 
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lacked the proper jurisdiction to hear the case and later vetoed a United Nations Security Council 
resolution calling on all states to observe international law, effectively preventing Nicaragua 
from receiving any compensation (Chomsky, 2003: 121). In other circumstances, states may 
attempt to support the use of international law as the cost of losing it becomes too high 
(Slomanson, 2003: 48).  
 International legal sovereignty is primarily concerned with “establishing the status of a 
political entity in the international system” including its territorial boundaries (Krasner, 1999: 
14). While Canada is recognized as sovereign state at the United Nations, and many other 
international bodies, its territorial boundaries have not been universally accepted. Canada is 
currently engaged in a number of territorial disputes with neighboring Arctic states making it 
difficult to enforce its territorial integrity.  
Other states are critical of Canada’s legal claim to the Arctic water ways and have gone 
as far to suggest Canada is operating outside of the confounds of international law by claiming 
all of the Arctic waters ways as internal waters (Holmes, 2008: 332). However, if Canada is able 
to demonstrate control of its Northern territory for a long period of time, it could result in its 
authority being accepted by the international community. If Canada could demonstrate greater 
control of the NWP through regulation and policing, as well as offering emergency services, the 
international community would be more inclined to accept Canada’s authority in the region.  In 
other words, improvements in domestic control can ultimately lead to the strengthening of 
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty.   
2.6 Westphalian Sovereignty 
Finally, sovereignty has been understood as the Westphalian model.  “Westphalian 
sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from 
   15  
  
authority structures within a given territory” (Krasner, 1999: 20). In its simplest form, this type 
of sovereignty refers to the ability of a state to choose the policies and institutions they regard as 
optimal without outside interference.  
 One of the most important aspects of Westphalian sovereignty is the notion that the 
domestic authority structures of a state should operate without foreign inference both internally 
and externally. Historically, this conception of sovereignty has been favored by weaker states 
and opposed by stronger states (Krasner, 1999: 21). This is an important consideration, as 
powerful states must be cautious regarding the precedents they set, specifically those pertaining 
to the establishment of territorial boundaries, which may affect their national interests in the 
future (Waltz, 1979: 82). For example, if the United States recognizes Canada’s claim to the 
ownership of the Northwest Passage, it could encourage other states to claim important 
waterways effectively closing them off to international passage.   
 The next section examines sovereignty issues that pertain to the land versus those that 
pertain to the water, as they are based on two separate bodies of law and require separate 
considerations. The legal requirements of sovereignty are closely related to issues of authority 
and control.  
2.7 Control of the Land 
 Canada’s claim to the Arctic landmass is far less controversial than its claim to the Arctic 
water ways. Canada inherited its title to the Arctic landmass from Britain in the late 1870s.  In 
1907, a Canadian senator attempted to expand Canadian jurisdiction in the Arctic by using sector 
theory to claim all the land, sea, and ice up to the North Pole (Gunitskiy, 2008: 265). During the 
1920s, Norway, the United States, and Denmark began exploring the Arctic. One particular area 
   16  
  
of interest was Ellesmere Island and the surrounding territory. All three states made claims of 
ownership which were contested by Canada.  
 In 1933, a ruling made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) laid the foundation for 
Canada to establish its sovereignty over the Arctic. The case in question involved Eastern 
Greenland, a disputed piece of territory between Denmark and Norway. The court ruling 
emphasized the role of the state in determining ownership:  
These acts, coupled with activities of the Danish hunting expeditions which were 
supported by the Danish government, the increase in the number of scientific expeditions 
engaged in mapping and exploring the country with the authorization and encouragement 
of the government, show to a sufficient extent-even when separated history of the 
preceding periods-two elements necessary to establish valid title to sovereignty, namely: 
the intention and will to exercise such sovereignty and the manifestations of state activity 
(Hyde, 1933: 732 ). 
 
The court’s ruling set a clear precedent by which a country could establish its territorial 
sovereignty. In order for Canada to bolster its sovereignty, the government must increase its 
presence in the region. This emphasizes the pivotal role of the Canadian government in 
improving its sovereignty claim.  In short, the Canadian government needs to be directly 
involved if the country is going to strengthen its claim to the Arctic.   
This of course is problematic. In recent years, Canada has neglected its naval patrols of 
the region and is currently engaged in direct territorial disputes with Denmark and the United 
States. There is an urgent need to increase the governments’ presence in regards to infrastructure 
and vital services. A greater level of state activity is required if Canada is to improve its 
sovereignty claim (Huebert, 2005: 21). As part of this effort, the government will have to 
encourage economic development. One means of doing this is to encourage oil and gas 
exploration. 
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 Domestic sovereignty can be improved by increasing the government presence in the 
region and by increasing the level of services provided to the occupants of the region. By 
exercising a greater level of control in the region, Canada will improve its domestic sovereignty 
and consequently its international legal and Westphalian sovereignty. However, this applies only 
to Canada’s claim to the land and not its Arctic waterways. 
2.8 Control of the Water 
 Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the Arctic waterways is not universally accepted and 
there are many competing interests in the region. Territorial claims to the Arctic seaways date all 
the way back to the beginning of the 20th century. In 1909, Canada was the first country to make 
a claim to the Arctic region, when the Canadian government claimed all the territory from its 
Arctic shore to the North Pole using the sector principle. The United States made a counter claim 
in 1924, arguing that the North Pole was an underwater continuation of Alaska.  Soon after, the 
Soviet Union claimed the waters from its Northern shore to the Kola Peninsula and the Bering 
Strait, extending all the way up the North Pole (Gunitskiy, 2008: 264-265). These conflicting 
claims were never resolved.  
Over the last decade the competing claims to Arctic territorial waters have increased.   
These competing claims are governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).  The UNLCOS framework was created to govern “nearly every aspect of maritime 
law, including sovereignty limits, navigation, seabed mining, and environmental protection of 
the world's oceans” (Holmes, 2008: 331). The UNCLOS framework provides a mechanism for 
resolving ocean related territorial disputes. According to the convention, a state can claim a 230-
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off its coast.  In the EEZ, each state is allowed to exploit all 
natural resources including subsurface oil and gas reserves (Gunitskiy, 2008: 266-267).   A state 
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can extend its territory beyond the EEZ, provided the territory is an extension of its continental 
shelf.   
Canada is currently mapping the outer limits of its continental shelf.  The Canadian 
government has committed over C$110 million to the mapping of the seabed shelf on Canada’s 
Atlantic and Arctic sea coasts. The government action in this regard will go a long way to 
increasing its control and authority in the region. When Canada submits its claim to the 
Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelves (CLCS), it could potentially add up to 1.75 
million square kilometers to its Arctic territory (Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, 
2009: 18). However, a number of outstanding territorial disputes are likely to threaten Canada’s 
claim to the Arctic, including the status of the Northwest Passage, the dispute over Hans Island 
and the Kennedy Channel, the maritime boundary between Alaska and the Yukon. 
Even with a successful claim to the CLCS, a number of challenges will still threaten 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. One of the main difficulties Canada will have to overcome is 
the commonly held perception that Canada lacks control of the region. As the Arctic scholar 
Andrew Charron observes “insufficient resources and personnel have been dedicated to the 
Arctic to demonstrate a significant presence, thereby weakening Canada’s sovereignty claim” 
(Charron, 2005: 5).  
 Despite its lack of control, Canada has taken two important steps to ensure its claim to 
the Arctic water ways is recognized under international law. The first step is the establishment of 
straight base lines around the archipelago to determine territorial waters. This is based on 1951 
ICJ case that ruled in favor of Norway for its establishment of a straight baseline around its coast 
(Ngantcha, 1990: 26). Canada followed suit in 1986 by establishing straight baselines through its 
Arctic archipelago. As part of the process, the Canadian government published official maps and 
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tables to define the baseline as required by article 16 of UNCLOS (Office of the Judge Advocate, 
2005: 263-264). As part of this claim, Canada argued that the internal waters were based on 
historic title. The second step is the expansion of Canada’s costal boundaries from 3 to 12 
nautical miles. These two actions effectively closed off the North West passage. At the time 
there was little in the way of resistance to the Canadian claims as the passage was covered in ice 
and closed to regular shipping.  Now that the ice is beginning to recede, the Canadian claims to 
the region are being met with intense opposition. The fact that Canada waited over three decades 
to claim the strait base lines boundaries tends to weaken its case (Franckx, 1993: 108). 
 Canadian Arctic waters are important to Canada as well as the international community. 
States dependent on trade want to be able to utilize the Northwest Passage, a seaway that runs 
through the Canadian Archipelago connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Currently, no 
commercial vessel is able to navigate the passage without the assistance of ice breakers to clear 
the way. In the next two to three decades, the ice could melt enough for these ships to travel 
through the passage without any assistance (Binkely, 2008: 1).  
A number of states have contested the Canadian claim to the passage. These states, led by 
the United States, have argued that the channels in the Arctic Archipelago form a straight which, 
under UNCLOS III, can be used for international navigation (Rothwell, 1996: 23). When the 
Northwest Passage was completely frozen there was no need to determine who controlled it, but 
now that the ice is melting and a new shipping route may be opening up the issue of control is 
becoming more important (Binkely, 2008: 1-2).  
The Canadian government has suggested it is sovereign over the waters of the NWP 
based on historical title. However, the government must be able to demonstrate its exclusive 
control over the territory for a lengthy period of time in order to successfully claim historical 
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ownership. As discussed previously, if Canada can demonstrate greater control over the NWP it 
could lead to the gradual acceptance of its sovereignty in the region. In short, Canada needs to 
increase its control of the North in order to strengthen its sovereignty claim.  
2.9 Conclusion 
 Canada’s claim over the Arctic has grown more secure in the last century, from the early 
territorial challenges in the 1920s regarding Ellesmere Island to the sovereignty crisis of the 
1980s concerning the passage of U.S vessels in Canadian territorial waters. The establishment of 
the archipelagic baseline and creation of legislation to limit pollution are good starting points, 
but have done very little to increase government control of the region.   
 Over the past several decades, Canada has taken a number of steps that have helped 
solidify its claim to the region. However, none of these actions have increased the level of 
control exercised by the federal government. As discussed previously, the requirements and 
perception of sovereignty change overtime but the ability to demonstrate control can serve to 
improve domestic and interdependence sovereignty, which in turn can alter the perception of 
other states and increase Westphalian and international legal Soveringty.  
 The purpose of this chapter was to frame the sovereignty issue in a way that would 
highlight what aspects are missing from Canada’s claim. While there are no serious threats to 
Canada’s control over its land mass, the government must continue to demonstrate its presence 
and control in the region. This can be achieved by promoting research, facilitating economic 
development, deploying military personal and technologies, and building new infrastructure. 
This is based upon the ICJ ruling regarding ownership of Eastern Greenland, which highlighted 
the need for government involvement if a sovereignty claim is going to be successful. 
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 The Canadian government needs to consider sovereignty from a broad perspective and 
not narrowly from the confines of a military point of view. Canada needs to go beyond defense 
based consideration to improve its sovereignty to include economic development plans.  
In order to improve its control of the region, Canada needs to support economic development and 
the building of new infrastructure for commercial use.  
 The remainder of this paper will focus on three elements of sovereignty that can be 
achieved through energy developments: control, infrastructure, and economic development. The 
exploration of offshore oil and gas resources is a good starting point. Once these resources are 
brought online they can foster economic development and bolster Canada’s control of the region. 
This brings up two related questions: How can the government encourage the development of 
these resources? To what extent does the government have to be directly involved? These 
questions will be answered in the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
APPROACHES TO ENERGY POLICY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2008, Prime Minister Harper outlined the government’s plan to map the Arctic seabed 
for energy and mineral resources “in order to encourage development and defend Canadian 
sovereignty in the far North” (Boswell, 2010). Harper summed up the government’s position 
succinctly: “To develop the North we must know the North. To protect the North, we must 
control the North. And to accomplish all our goals for the North, we must be in the North” 
(Boswell, 2010).  Harper’s position corresponds with the previous discussion on sovereignty. In 
order for Canada to improve its sovereignty claim it must demonstrate greater control over the 
land and seaways in the North. Energy development is one means to achieve this.  
Energy developments provide an opportunity for the Canadian government to increase its 
control of the region. In order to capitalize on this opportunity the Canadian government will 
need to ensure new energy projects are used to promote the national interest. As the Canadian 
Foreign Policy Specialist Rob Huebert observes, “what is needed is a coherent and 
comprehensive strategy that begins to develop the policy tools now to ensure that Canada’s 
interest are protected in the Canadian North. In this manner, the Canadian Arctic will not be lost 
by incremental defeats” (Huebert, 2005: 10). The question then, is what type of energy policy 
will encourage the development of Arctic resources?  
The theory regarding energy policy sits within the wider literature that deals with 
International Political Economy (IPE). In a broad sense, IPE examines the role of states and 
international institutions in managing conflicts and facilitating cooperation in the global political 
economy. It focuses on the interrelationship between public and private power in the allocation 
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of scarce resources. Unlike other social science disciplines, IPE does not have a specific 
approach to studying the subject. It offers a variety of ideas and theoretical frameworks in which 
to understand and view the complex global economy.  
As a discipline IPE focuses on the interaction of economics and politics at the global, 
regional, and national level. Robert Gilpin, a noted IPE scholar, defines political economy “as 
the interaction of markets and powerful actors” (Gilpin and Gilpin, 2001: 45). Gilpin suggests 
that one cannot comprehend how the global economy functions without an appreciation of how 
markets operate and how the state and other actors attempt to manipulate the market. There are 
three theoretical schools that dominate IPE: the Realist, Liberal, and Structuralist schools. 
Although each school consists of a wide range of beliefs and ideas, the authors generally 
subscribe to a set of core assumptions (Cohn, 2000: 27).  
IPE offers two approaches for understanding energy policy, the realist and liberal models. 
The focus of liberal scholars is the individual, or entrepreneur, as rational self motivated actors 
(Cohn, 2003: 91). The liberal model emphasizes the role of the free market in determining what 
goods should be produced and for whom. Liberals tend to treat politics and economics as 
separate entities.  Realists on the other hand examine economic transactions through a veil of 
relational power, and assume states are constantly attempting to maximize power and relative 
gains. The focus of realist thinkers is the state, which is given priority over economics (Frieden 
and Lake, 1995: 143). Realists are primarily concerned with the redistribution of power in the 
international arena but share a commitment to global capitalism along with liberals (Cohn, 2003: 
72). Energy policy can be pursued through either of these two models. In the past, Canada has 
used both approaches to encourage the development of its Northern resources.  
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This chapter considers realist and liberal policy approaches to the development of energy 
resources. This chapter argues that adopting a realist approach is more likely to improve 
Canada’s sovereignty claim, as developing Arctic resources serves a social benefit function. The 
main contention here is that the social value of exploration in the Arctic exceeds its private value 
because these activities will bolster Canada’s claim to the region. The social benefits are twofold. 
First, they will benefit the state by creating new sources of tax revenue and by increasing 
government presence in the region. Second, they will provide new opportunities for economic 
growth, including the creation of new jobs, for citizens and communities in the North. 
Developing these resources provides an opportunity for economic development that would 
otherwise not exist. Canadian’s in the South could also benefit from the development of new 
energy sources in the North. New sources of energy could provide a cushion for price spikes in 
the global energy market. The development of Northern reserves could help reduce Canada’s 
dependence on foreign oil imports.   
3.2 Energy and the Sovereignty Areas of Interest 
 
The responsible development of Canada’s northern resources is important if Canada is to 
strengthen its sovereignty claim in the Arctic. Recall that there are three areas of sovereignty 
interest: control, infrastructure, and economic development. These three areas of interest can 
enhance domestic and interdependence sovereignty and by extension international legal and 
Westphalian sovereignty. These three aspects are closely linked. One cannot be achieved without 
the other. Without adequate infrastructure, economic development cannot take place. Similarly, 
without sustainable economic development, Northern governments will not have the necessary 
resources to provide essential social services (Griffiths, 2008: 23). If the government is unable to 
provide its citizens with basic services, it cannot be said it is exercising effective control.  
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Economic development is required if the state is to provide its northern citizens with a 
decent standard of living comparable to that enjoyed by Canadians in the south. In this regard, 
energy developments have a two pronged effect; first, energy projects create new job 
opportunities and linkages to other industries (Marcel and Mitchell, 2006: 123); second, they 
provide territorial and federal governments with taxes and rents, from which these governments 
can increase the level of service being provided to the citizens of the North. As noted in the 
previous chapter there is an urgent need to increase the governments’ presence in regards to 
infrastructure and vital services. 
Developing Arctic resources offers the Canadian government a pathway to achieve 
economic growth.  However, developing these resources involves overcoming a series of 
obstacles unique to non-conventional resource development. Bringing Canada’s Northern energy 
reserves online will not be cheap, easy or quick. Developing frontier resources is more 
technically challenging and considerably more expensive than conventional projects. There are 
long lead times between discoveries and actual production. Consider, for example, the Hibernia 
project off the coast of Newfoundland. The Hibernia field was discovered in 1979, but actual 
development did not take place until the 1990s. The field first produced oil in 1997, almost 
twenty years after its initial discovery.  Part of the reason for the long lead time, was the 
unwillingness of private oil companies to commit the necessary funding for such a risky and 
expensive project. Development moved forward only after the federal government increased its 
stake in the project by forming the Canada Hibernia Holding Corporation (Shimpton, 2003: 3). 
In this case, the government’s role was to encourage economic development by investing directly 
in the development of oil and gas reserves.  
   26  
  
By encouraging energy investment the government can also encourage the development 
of new infrastructure. Petroleum industry activity contributes to a “wide range of construction, 
fabrication, supply, service, education, training, and research and development infrastructure.” 
As observed in a study conducted by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
Department of Mines and Energy, the development of oil related infrastructure provides “a major 
boost to the local construction industry, generating demands for materials and equipment, as well 
as engineering, project management and construction services” (Shimpton, 2003: 7).  
In other words, energy developments can contribute to the creation of vital infrastructure 
and economic growth but this requires that a minimal amount of infrastructure already exist. 
Creating new energy infrastructure including roads, seaports and airports reduces the overall cost 
of non-conventional oil projects. It can also improve Canada’s control of the region, by 
increasing the Federal and Territorial government’s ability to be involved in construction 
activities. By reducing the cost of these projects, private investors are more likely to be attracted 
to the region.  
Encouraging the exploration and development of petroleum resources in the Arctic can 
help Canada improve its control of the region. This in turn can improve its domestic and 
international legal sovereignty.  The question then, is how can the government encourage the 
development of these resources? What energy policy best serves Canada’s interests in the 
region? These questions will be examined in the following section.  
3.3 Theoretical Applications to Energy 
Decisions regarding energy policy take place in the wider context of government 
intervention in the economic system generally (Stevens, 2002: 1). Hence, to appreciate the 
connection between energy policy and sovereignty it is necessary first to examine the major 
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tenets of the two energy approaches, realism and liberalism. A good definition of realism is 
provided by Balaam and Veseth who suggest realism “accounts for the compulsion of states to 
use the economy to generate wealth but also to adopt a variety of protectionist trade, investment, 
and other policies to sustain that wealth and condition the behaviour of other states” (Balaam and 
Veseth, 1995: 21). Liberalism on the other hand calls for the economic role of government to be 
limited as the market is considered to be a superior mechanism for allocating scarce resources. 
The theoretical foundation of both approaches will be examined in the following section. 
In the past, Canada has adopted both liberal and realist approaches to the development of 
its Arctic energy resources. From 1975 to 1985, Canada directly participated in the oil and gas 
industry through its NOC Petro-Canada. As part of the National Energy Program (NEP), the 
government was actively involved in exploring and producing resources in the Canadian North. 
After 1985, the government shifted to a liberal policy encouraging private sector investment and 
removing Petro-Canada’s role as a tool of public policy.  
For a country like Canada, which is both an importer and exporter of non-renewable 
energy, the goal of any energy policy is to meet two objectives. First, it must ensure the 
continued availability of energy to satisfy domestic demand. Second, the development of the 
nation’s energy reserves must be done in a manner which serves to maximize the national 
interest (Hay, 2009: 143).  Obviously the definition of national interest is subjective. Both the 
realist and liberal perspectives understand the concept of national interest differently. More will 
be said on this in the next few pages, as the key elements of each policy approach are examined.  
3.3.1 Realism & State Intervention 
 
Realism has been the dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of 
international relations theory.  Its roots can be traced back to the works of Thucydides, 
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Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Realism emphasizes the state as the primary actor in world 
politics. The purpose of statecraft is national survival in an anarchic environment. The concept of 
anarchy is the cornerstone of the Realist paradigm. As Kenneth Waltz explains, “anarchy stems 
from the fact that states answer to no higher authority and so must look to themselves to protect 
their interests and ensure their survival” (Waltz, 1979: 102). Since all states are subject to the 
conditions of an anarchic world they seek to maximize their power and consequently their 
wealth. Therefore the attainment of power is the rational goal of a state’s foreign and economic 
policy.  
For realists international politics can be defined as a continual struggle between power-
maximizing states (Gilpin and Gilpin, 2001: 12). Realists primarily concern themselves with the 
redistribution of power within the capitalist system because they generally assume that wealth is 
finite, that there is a limited amount of natural resources that can be extracted to create more 
wealth. Access to energy and the development of domestic energy reserves is a high priority. In 
such circumstances it is rational for states to compete for power and limited resources.  
Realists suggest that the international system is based on a zero-sum game in which the 
gains of one state are the losses of another.  In other words if one state gains more resources, it is 
denying those resources to other states, increasing its relative power. Under this premise each 
state is expected to manipulate the market in ways that maximize the relative gains (Cohn, 2000: 
45).  
 Realism encourages cooperation as it relates to security, but it is less favorable toward 
cooperation that leads to economic interdependence. As Waltz observes, “a state also worries lest 
it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and 
services” (Waltz, 1979: 124). Therefore a state must attempt to avoid enhancing its security 
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through alliances based on economic interdependence. As such, a state’s strategic planning is 
aimed at survival and long-term security.  
In regards to energy policy, realists would seek to satisfy energy security issues by 
reducing dependence on foreign energy producers (Hay, 2009: 143). Consequently, the 
development of local sources of energy is a high priority.  The commercial interests of the 
private sector are secondary to the objectives of the state. The national interest is achieved 
through the development of local energy reserves in order to minimize dependence on foreign 
imports.  
Realists favour a strong state role in the economy, viewing state action as necessary to 
gain wealth and power. As the energy scholar James Hay observes, from the realist standpoint 
“market intervention is warranted, if necessary, to ensure that domestic industry survives and 
flourishes.” Generally, this intervention comes in the form of a national oil company (NOC). A 
NOC can be described as “an oil company operating in some part of the oil value chain owned 
and controlled by government” (Stevens, 2001: 4). 
For realists, the rationale for state participation is driven by a belief that national interests 
are served more effectively through an NOC than through market forces (Noreng, 2002: 197). 
Through direct intervention the state is able to choose socially beneficial energy projects over 
more profitable ones. NOCs can be directed to explore and produce oil in areas that are not 
financially viable for market forces. Consider the example of Statoil, the Norwegian NOC. 
Statoil invested millions of dollars exploring the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) at a time 
when private companies had little interest in the region. The company was successful in 
exploring for oil which in turn attracted foreign investors (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007: 24-25).  
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NOCs often have policy objectives that go beyond simply exploring and producing oil 
and gas. Oil producing governments have opted to use NOCs for a wide array of policy 
objectives, including job creation, building social infrastructure and assisting in regional 
development (Macpherson, 2003: 5).  As a World Bank energy study suggests, NOCs “are often 
the instrument for achieving a broad  range  of  national,  social  and  political  objectives  that  
go  well  beyond  their  original purpose of maximizing  revenues  for  their governments” 
(World Bank, 2001: 1).  
Establishing an NOC allows a government to gain at least partial control over its oil and 
gas industry. The close relationship between the government and the company helps to protect 
the national interest of the state (Falola and Genova, 2005: 57). As mentioned earlier, NOCs will 
often pursue projects designed to achieve a social goal not solely an economic one. As Falola 
and Genova observe, “a national oil company has strong incentives to use national personnel and 
national goods and services” (2005: 57). In doing so, the company contributes to the economic 
development goals of the state. This is especially true when it comes to building new 
infrastructure. Oil infrastructure can be built anywhere in a country in order to maximize the 
social benefit by stimulating regional development. For example, in 1980 the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) built the Kaduna refinery in the northern part of the country, far 
away from the oil fields in the south. The company’s reason for doing so was to encourage the 
economic development of the North (Falola and Genova, 2005: 58).  
It is not difficult to see the link between realism and control. Realists argue that state 
intervention is required to ensure domestic energy reserves are being developed. This is 
particularly important when market forces are unwilling to invest the needed capital in higher 
risk projects. These projects include offshore oil and gas developments in the Arctic, which are 
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far more expensive than conventional projects. By intervening in the oil and gas industry the 
government can encourage the development of socially beneficial projects that market forces 
alone are unwilling to do (Marcel and Mitchell, 2006: 21). While there are obvious advantages to 
using a NOC, it is not the only policy tool that can encourage regional development.  An 
alternative approach to energy development is provided by the liberal school of thought. This 
approach emphasizes the role of markets in determining what energy sources should be 
developed.  
3.3.2 Liberalism and the Free Market  
Liberalism is perhaps the most unified of the three IPE frameworks.  While there are 
several varieties of liberalism, the core principles of open markets and free trade encompass 
them all. The origin of economic liberalism is often traced back to the work of Adam Smith, who 
is widely considered the grandfather of classical economics. Smith argued that a division of 
labour in society creates a natural balance that is governed by an “invisible hand” which 
translates self-seeking behaviour into socially beneficial outcomes (Ravenhill, 2005: 45-46). In 
other words, societies will benefit the most when each individual pursues what is in their own 
best interest. The liberal model places emphasis on individual enterprise, market competition, 
and a minimalist role for the state, where the state should only intervene in the economy to 
ensure the successful operation of the markets.  
 The focal point of liberal scholars is the individual, who posses “inalienable natural rights 
and must be protected from collectivise such as labour unions, churches, and the state” (Cohn, 
2008: 72). The liberal point of view generally separates the realms of economics and politics. 
The majority of liberal scholars generally suggest the only role of the state is to ensure an open 
environment in which market transactions can take place (Ravenhill, 2005: 48). As such, the 
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main function of the state is to ensure there is adequate infrastructure to support production and 
transportation.  
 In regards to energy policy, liberals “would seek to satisfy energy security issues via the 
interdependence of the international energy market” (Hay, 2009: 143). Liberals argue that a 
diverse supply of energy, coming from multiple sources, will reduce the chance of supply 
disruption. Arguably, a liberal policy offers the most economical means to ensuring energy 
supply is consistent and prices remain relatively stable.  
 Concerning national interest, liberals argue that the commercial interests of private actors 
are in sync with the national interest of the state. The goals of the private sector are to maximize 
profit by developing resources as cheaply and as efficiently as possible. This runs parallel to the 
interest of the state which is to earn revenue off the development of energy reserves and to 
ensure a continued and reliable supply of energy. Therefore, market forces should be allowed to 
develop energy reserves unhindered by government intervention. In the case of Canada, this 
means Arctic energy reserves should be developed by private investors as is currently the 
practice. However, because government presence is required to strengthen Canada’s sovereignty 
claim a purely market approach may not lead to the strengthening of Canada’s sovereignty claim.  
 Under a liberal energy approach, private companies are free to pursue whichever projects 
they deem economical. However, developing Arctic projects involves substantial risk and the 
long lead times between exploration and commercial development means only the largest energy 
companies will be involved (Rowatt, 2006: 15).  This includes the major international oil 
companies (IOC), Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, and a handful of smaller independent 
companies, Devon Energy, Conoco Phillips, Husky, etc. Due to the fact that these private oil 
companies are primarily concerned with creating shareholder value, new projects have to meet 
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specific financial benchmarks in order to be financially viable (Jaffe, 2007: 23-24). This is 
problematic when it comes to developing non-conventional resources in the frontier areas. 
Developing Arctic resources is more technically and physically challenging than typical 
conventional projects. The high cost and high risk associated with these projects means new 
developments will evolve slowly.  
 When private energy companies look to develop new projects, they do so with the goal of 
maximizing profit. The projects that ultimately get developed are those that are likely to return a 
profit in the current time frame as well as in the future (Pirog, 2007: 34). As such, energy 
companies develop the cheapest and easiest projects first (Jaffe, 2007: 34). For Canada, this 
means conventional resources in the Western basin. Only after conventional projects have been 
exhausted, or at least spoken for, have private companies looked to non-conventional projects to 
replace diminishing reserves. Since the oil industry is global in scale, this leaves a lot of 
alternatives to be developed first, before real interest in non-conventional projects takes place. 
Non-conventional projects tend to be the last in line as they are the most expensive to develop. In 
almost all cases, non-conventional projects have only been launched with large scale government 
financial support. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.  
 In short, Canada’s liberal approach to energy development is dependent on oil companies 
looking for the cheapest possible means to replace diminishing reserves. This makes expensive 
Arctic projects an unattractive prospect. However, recent changes in the global oil industry may 
work to the advantage of Canada. Over the last decade the global oil industry has witnessed a 
resurgence of petro-nationalism. This type of nationalism can be described as the tendency of 
governments to assert control over oil and gas developments located on their territory (Marcel, 
2006: 15). A number of oil producing countries, which previously liberalized there energy sector, 
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have tightened restrictions on foreign ownership. In some cases, IOCs have been forced out of 
state-controlled oil patches. A good example is the Kovykta gas field in Eastern Siberia. The 
Russian government threatened to revoke an environmental license required to proceed with the 
project if British Petroleum was unwilling to sell its majority stake in the project. Fearing it 
would lose other projects in Russia, BP reluctantly sold its stake to the Russian NOC Gazprom 
(Henrich, 2008: 1553).   
 The increasing presence of state controlled companies in the global oil industry is 
challenging the role of IOCs. Virtually every IOC is currently producing more oil every year 
than it is replacing with new discoveries.  IOCs are under increased pressure to replace already 
produced reserves and to increase the recovery rate from mature wells (Marcel, 2006: 9). 
Between 1996 and 2006, oil production from the five largest IOCs (BP, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, 
and Shell) fell from 10.25 million barrels per day (BPD) in 1996 to 9.7 million bpd in 2006 
(Jaffe, 2007: 25).  
Over the past three decades, IOCs have been able to support long term growth 
expectations of up to four percent per year.  However, current reserve estimates no longer 
support this rate of growth (Wadood, 2006:1-2).  This is evident in a statement made by 
Chevron’s CEO David O’Reilly after Chevron’s purchase of Unocal. Speaking to senior 
associates, O’Reilly suggested “it is no longer possible to assume that global hydrocarbon 
reserves will grow indefinitely or that Chevron’s aging fields will be adequately replaced by new 
found deposits” (Klare, 2008: 3). 
 As a result of these changes in the global oil industry, IOCs have stared to invest heavily 
in non-conventional projects. A good example is the Alberta oil sands. In recent years the 
number of oil companies operating in the oil sands has nearly tripled (Schiell and Loney, 2007: 
   35  
  
434). However as noted previously, the creation of the technology needed to develop the oil 
sands required large scale government support (Jaffe, 2007A: 25). It was only after the 
government invested heavily in the Alberta oil sands that private sector interest in the projects 
took off. This highlights one of the main problems in adopting a liberal approach. Non-
conventional projects tend to be slow in developing due to the enormous cost of these projects. 
Without large scale government support these projects often fail to take off. Considering that 
Arctic projects require the development of specialized technology and are substantially more 
expensive to develop than conventional projects, it is unlikely Canada will be able to improve its 
sovereignty claim through market forces alone.  
3.4 Conclusion 
 The issues of Arctic sovereignty and Arctic energy development are closely linked. 
Energy developments can strengthen a state’s claim to sovereignty by increasing state control. 
This can be achieved through the creation of new infrastructure and by fostering economic 
development.  These three elements are essential for an effective sovereignty claim. All three 
serve to increase the authority of the state, an essential component in strengthening sovereignty.  
 Energy development is one pathway to help improve a state’s sovereignty claim. States 
pursue energy policy via one of two approaches. Realist policy approaches call for state control 
of resources, championing self sufficiency over cooperation with other countries.  Liberal policy 
approaches embody the ideas of free trade, comparative advantage and security through 
interdependence. 
 The concept of national interest is perceived differently between these two models. For 
liberals, the national interest is best served when a country’s resources are developed efficiently 
at minimal cost.  This involves allowing private companies to explore and develop energy 
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reserves in the manner they see most fit. The liberal approach would encourage the government 
to build new infrastructure that can aid in the development of Arctic resources, but not to directly 
intervene in the industry. The realist approach on other hand, sees the national interests being 
served when local sources of energy are being developed to benefit domestic industry. This 
approach calls for government intervention in the energy industry to ensure local energy reserves 
are being developed. Most often this is done through an NOC.  
 Due to the unique circumstances in the Canadian Arctic, including lack of infrastructure, 
and distance to consumer markets, energy developments have been slow in progressing. The 
high cost and high risk associated with operating in the area has made private oil companies 
reluctant to invest the needed capital in Arctic projects. However, the fact that IOCs are spending 
large amounts of money to explore for oil in unfavorable areas suggests that all the easy oil is 
gone or spoken for (Guzman, 2006: 12).  
For Canada, this means that Arctic resources are becoming more attractive to the large 
IOCs and independent energy companies. However, this does not mean that private companies 
are rushing to develop the Arctic. Although interest in the region is certainly growing, there is no 
guarantee that private companies will invest the needed capital and resources into developing 
Arctic resources in a timely and efficient manner. Since Canada’s sovereignty concerns are 
growing, these resources need to be brought online sooner rather than later. By intervening in the 
oil and gas industry the government can encourage the development of these resources. Adopting 
a realist approach to energy development in Arctic would allow the government to increase its 
presence in the North and strengthen its sovereignty claim in the process.
  
CHAPTER 4: 
COMPARING ARCTIC ENERGY APPROACHES 
4.1 Introduction  
 For the last twenty years, Canada has championed the use of market forces in developing 
its Northern resources. In relying on a liberal policy, Canada has let the market determine what 
areas are to be explored for energy resources and what projects are to be developed. Russia has 
taken the opposite approach to developing its Northern energy resources. Russia`s energy policy 
is highly nationalistic and reflects many of the central tenants of the realist model. In the last 
decade, Russia has taken steps to ensure its Arctic resources will be developed by state 
controlled companies and not foreign investors. Norway`s approach is situated in the middle 
between the Canadian and Russian models. The Norwegian approach is a mixed model system, 
incorporating elements of both the liberal and realist approaches. Since 1973, Norway has used 
the state-controlled company Statoil to develop offshore resources while at the same allowing 
private companies to compete with its NOC.  
 Returning to the question posed at the beginning of the previous chapter, what type of 
energy policy will encourage the development of Arctic resources? We can answer it by 
examining the energy approaches adopted by other Arctic states. This chapter examines the 
energy approaches of Norway and Russia, looking for similarities with and alternatives to the 
Canadian approach. These countries have unique energy models with varying degrees of state 
control, making them ideal for comparison against the Canadian approach. Energy developments 
can improve a state’s claim to sovereignty by increasing state control in the region, creating new 
infrastructure and fostering economic development. These three components are essential to 
demonstrating effective sovereignty. Each will be examined in the following case studies.   
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Figure 4.1 
Arctic Petroleum Territories and Seaways 
 
  Source: Krisitn Rønning and Statoil, Exploring the Basins of the Arctic, 20071  
 
                                                
1 The map shows the approximate boundaries of the major seaways and petroleum territories in 
the Arctic.    
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Each case study provides a broad overview of the history of oil and gas development in 
the Arctic. The purpose of the case studies is to examine how the policy approach has impacted 
state sovereignty in the North. What effect has energy policy had on the sovereignty areas of 
interest: control, infrastructure, and economic development? The first case study to be examined 
is Russia, followed by Norway. These two cases have been selected based on their ability to shed 
light on the impact of energy policy on Arctic sovereignty.  This chapter argues that by directly 
intervening in the energy industry, both Norway and Russia have strengthened their sovereignty 
claims in the Arctic through the creation of new infrastructure and by fostering economic 
development.  
4.2 Russia’s Energy Approach 
 The Russian oil industry is substantially different from that of Canada. Similar to 
Norway, Russia’s energy industry contains a mix of private and state-owned energy companies. 
In the case of Russia, the term state-owned is no longer applicable to describe companies that act 
in accordance with the state. The term state controlled is more reflective of the current state of 
energy companies with close ties to the Kremlin and other state bodies (Ziegler, 2008: 142). 
While the Russian government may no longer outright own these companies, they behave similar 
to any other state owned company. An example of this is the private oil company Lukoil which 
has continually operated in a subservient manner to the Kremlin since its founding in 1993.  
Over the course of the last decade, the Russian oil industry has undergone substantial 
changes. The Putin government placed tough restrictions on foreign ownership, while 
simultaneously enhancing the position of state controlled oil firms. As the political economist 
Andreas Heinrich observers, Putin forcefully “asserted the primacy of state interests in major 
decisions about energy and natural resources” (Heinrich, 2008: 1543). Following Putin’s 
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changes, the Russian government gained control of almost 60 percent of oil production and 
nearly all of natural gas production (Victor, 2004:  51). At the end of his second term, Putin 
signed a law limiting foreign ownership in strategic sectors. The law dramatically altered the 
relationship between the Russian oil industry and foreign investors. Under the new law, foreign 
companies need the approval of a special commission “for any acquisition exceeding 50 percent 
in a company operating in a strategic branch” (Heinrich, 2008: 1543). 
 Russia has returned to a realist energy policy after a decade of liberal reforms. In doing 
so, Russia has given tremendous power to its state controlled energy companies. Russia is 
relying on its NOCs to develop resources on the Russian Continental Shelf (RCS).  These 
companies play a pivotal role in developing offshore resources and fostering economic 
development while ensuring the Russian government is the primary benefactor. To this end, the 
Russian government divided control of the RCS between the two largest state-controlled energy 
companies, Rosneft and Gazprom (Heinrich, 2008: 1543). This combined with the new laws on 
foreign ownership make it increasingly unlikely that foreign investors will gain access to new 
reserves on the RCS.  
The privileged role of state controlled companies is not surprising considering the 
importance of the region. Currently, Russia’s Arctic region accounts for 11 percent of Russia’s 
GDP (Bochkarev, 2006: 3). Russia’s state controlled energy companies are political tools for 
Russia in the international arena, especially in the Arctic. As Russia’s energy policy becomes 
more intertwined with its domestic and foreign policies the importance of its state controlled 
companies is likely to grow.  
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4.2.1 History of Arctic Energy Development 
Oil developments are not new in the Russian Arctic but have been taking place since the 
early 1970s. Russia first used seismic surveys to map the Russian Barents Sea shelf in 1972. 
Initial exploration and drilling began in the 1980s in the shallow part of the western Barents and 
Pechora Seas (Moe, 1988: 135). Exploration continued throughout the 80s despite the drop in 
world oil prices. By 1989, several promising deposits were found on the Russian shelf, most 
notably the Shtokman gas deposit in the Barents Sea (1988) and the Prirazlomnoye oil deposit in 
the Pechora Sea (1989). Currently, both of these fields are being developed as a joint venture 
between Russia’s biggest NOCs, Gazprom and Rosneft (Åtland, 2009: 378).  
By 1992, over 200 exploration wells had been drilled in the Barents, Pechora and Kara 
Seas (Ter-Srakisov, 2007: 15). In the same year, the Russian government approved the 
development of a new national energy strategy designed to reflect the changing economic 
conditions in Russia. To this end, the Russian government created the Interagency Commission. 
The commission was charged with the task of mobilizing more than a “1,000 leading 
professionals from  central and local organizations as well as representatives of interested 
ministries and  departments, major regions of the country and science centers” to develop a new 
energy strategy (Basaran, 2003: 16). A large part of this strategy called for the privatization of 
the oil sector and the removal of state interference in the industry.  This marked the beginning of 
a major shift in Russian energy policy, which largely centered on privatizing state assets.   
The process of oil privatization began in November of 1992 when President Yeltsin 
issued presidential degree 1403 which established three vertically integrated oil companies: 
Lukoil, Yukos, and Surftneftgas (Poussenkova, 2007: 110). Over the next several years, a total of 
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11 vertically integrated oil companies were created all combining various aspects of exploration, 
production, refining, distributing, and marketing (Hill and Fee, 2002:  4). 
In the years following, exploration work on the continental shelf slowed considerably. As 
Russia shifted away from a realist to a liberal energy policy, interest in the Arctic shelf faded 
(Goldman, 2008: 71). Newly formed private oil companies had little in the interest in Arctic 
exploration due to the high cost of producing these resources. Similar to Canada, developments 
on the Arctic shelf were no longer considered economically viable. Without state support, newly 
privatized energy companies abandoned Arctic exploration.  
Interest in the Russian Arctic was renewed in early 2000s by Russia’s NOCs. In 2005, 
Gazprom and Rosneft formed joint ventures in five Arctic oil fields (Poussenkova, 2007:  29). 
Gazprom is now in the process of developing a program for the exploration of the RCS over the 
next decade (Ter-Srakisov, 2007: 17). The company plans to invest over US$500 million on the 
Arctic shelf in the next ten to fifteen years (Åtland, 2009: 378). Gazprom views the Arctic shelf 
as “a promising source of gas and liquid hydrocarbons, both new and prospected” (Kliewer, 
2006: 36). Gazprom’s wholly owned subsidiary, Sevmorneftegaz, is in the process of drilling its 
seventh exploration well in Shtokman, 550 km off the coast off the Kola Peninsula. These new 
projects have significantly increased Russian oil production.  Since the revival of Arctic 
developments in 2000, Russia’s production rates have increased significantly, so much so, that in 
February 2002, Russia oil output briefly overtook Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil 
producer (Hill and Fee, 2002:  1).  
4.2.2 Russia’s Energy Policy & Sovereignty 
 The realist approach taken by the Russian government reflects the importance of Arctic 
energy resources. Unlike Canada, whose concerns largely revolve around security and 
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sovereignty, “Russia’s approach to the region is increasingly governed by national economic 
interests rather than by national security interests” (Åtland, 2009: 372). This was made evident in 
September of 2008 when the Security Council of Russia set out the government’s key priorities 
in a document entitled The Fundamentals of Public Policy of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic up to 2020 and Beyond. The document reveals much about Russia’s intentions in the 
region. It outlines Russia’s basic national interests in the Arctic stating “National interests 
determine the main goals, key objectives, and strategic priorities of state policy of the Russian 
federation in the Arctic” (The Security Council of the Russian Federation, 2008: 2).  
 One of the document’s main objectives is to “provide a significant increase in the 
development of Arctic offshore fields, through the implementation of state programs of study 
and development of the continental shelf” (The Security Council of the Russian Federation, 
2008: 3). In order to achieve this goal, the government pledges support “of economic entities 
operating in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, particularly in the development of hydro 
carbon resources” (The Security Council of the Russian Federation, 2008: 2).   
Russia is less concerned with security and more concerned with gaining access to new 
resources. The goal of Russia’s Arctic strategy is to turn the region into a major resource base. 
The report outlines three separate phases through which to achieve this goal. The first phase 
running from 2008-10, involves exploring and mapping Russia’s continental shelf. This part of 
the strategy is already well underway (The Security Council of the Russian Federation, 2008: 6). 
As discussed previously, both Gazprom and Rosneft are in the process of exploring for energy 
resources in the Barents, Kara and Laptev Seas (Kliewer, 2006: 36).  
 The second phase of Russia’s Arctic strategy involves building new infrastructure to 
ensure “the competitive advantage of Russia on production and transportation of energy 
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resources.” New infrastructure is required to support the development oil and gas reserves and to 
ensure that the North Sea route is secured (Bochkarev, 2006: 5). Consequently, the development 
of new infrastructure is seen as a top priority.  
 In regards to sovereignty, building new infrastructure can serve a dual purpose: first; it 
can be used to foster economic development. The building of refineries, pipelines and terminals 
can be placed in strategic locations to maximize the social benefit and to bring development to 
areas in need. However, the building of new infrastructure requires that some infrastructure 
already exist. When Gazprom, Rosneft and other Russian companies are looking for places to 
construct oil, gas, and LNG export terminals, they base part of their assessment on the state of 
existing infrastructure including railways, roads and storage facilities (Åtland, 2009: 370) 
second; the creation of new infrastructure serves to demonstrate Russia’s control of the region.  
Russia’s North already has much of the needed infrastructure to develop resources off the 
continental shelf. In fact many of the best port facilities on the Kola Peninsula are under military 
control (Åtland, 2009: 372). The Russian petroleum industry is increasingly looking to these 
ports to act as export terminals for off-shore production.  There is a close connection between 
Russia’s NOCs and the development of new infrastructure in the North. Russia’s state owned 
companies are investing heavily in building new transport systems, upgrading seaports, and 
building new ships to develop offshore resources. For example, Rosneft has created plans to 
build 16 new ice breakers, along with 18 vessels used for seismic mapping on the Arctic Shelf. 
The company is also in the process of building 10 new stationary platforms used for drilling in 
ice covered waters (Poussenkova, 2007: 24). Gazprom is also undertaking infrastructure 
developments. In 2005, Gazprom started construction on a 572 km railway going to the 
Bovanenkovo gas field.  
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Beyond creating new infrastructure, Russia has started to convert old infrastructure for 
use by the energy industry. Russia is turning to its state controlled oil companies to retrofit old 
military infrastructure for commercial use. The company Rosshelf provides a good illustration. 
Rosshelf was created for the sole purpose of converting old military installations and 
technologies for use in offshore oil and gas developments in the Arctic (Moe, 1988: 135). The 
company has been highly successful in creating oil platforms out of decommissioned military 
ships.  
The resources on the Arctic shelf are seen as a key component in Russia economic 
revival and close cooperation between the oil industry and the navy will be beneficial to both 
parties (Åtland, 2009: 388). As Kristian Åtland, Senior Analyst of the Norwegian Defense 
Institute writes, “the Northern Fleet needs the oil industry, just like the oil industry needs the 
Northern Fleet” (2009: 389).  The resources on the Arctic shelf can only be developed with 
assistance of the navy’s ice breaker fleet. Nuclear icebreakers will play an important role in 
developing resources and securing the region (Bukharin, 2006: 25). This is an important 
consideration for Canada. Cooperation between government departments will be necessary to 
ensure government resources are being used to maximize benefits. The sharing of resources for 
both commercial and military use is essential.  As noted before, this approach is far more cost 
effective than simply stationing a military presence in the region and has the added advantage of 
increasing Westphalian sovereignty.  
  In short, the work of Russia’s state controlled energy companies has increased 
commercial activity in the North. The development of offshore oil and gas fields, the 
construction of new pipelines, terminals, and oil tankers is increasing the government presence 
both on and offshore. The close connection between the Russian government and its NOCs is 
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beneficial in improving Russian sovereignty claim by encouraging economic development in 
strategic areas. Expensive projects are being developed by state controlled companies to ensure 
the benefits are reaped by the Russian government. 
 Russia’s strategy for the North calls for “the transformation of the Arctic zone of the 
Russian Federation to become a strategic resource base” (The Security Council of the Russian 
Federation, 2008: 6). In turning the Arctic into a resource base, Russia is placing a high priority 
on commercial development and economic growth in the region. This is reflective of its energy 
approach, which encourages self sufficiency over cooperation with foreign companies. An 
opposite approach has been applied by Russia’s Arctic neighbor Norway. Norway has 
encouraged foreign investors to compete against the Norwegian NOC Statoil in the development 
of its Arctic resources.   
In regards to sovereignty, Russia has taken a broader approach that goes beyond simply 
ensuring security in the region. By transforming old military ports into centers for commercial 
development the Russian government has improved its domestic sovereignty. Through its 
offshore oil and gas projects, Russia has increased the states presence in the region, a 
requirement of effective legal sovereignty.  Similarly, Russia’s attempt to turn the Northeast 
Passage into a major trading route has increased its Westphalian sovereignty. This policy has 
been particularly successful in developing the region and bringing new opportunities for 
economic growth which further serves to improve domestic control. The fusion of commercial 
and defense goals has went a long way to improving Russia control of the region and 
consequently its sovereignty claim.       
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4.3 Norway’s Energy Approach 
The Norwegian approach to energy development incorporates elements from both the 
liberal and realist models. It is a mixed model system involving both public and private 
companies. The government directly participates in all aspects of the petroleum industry through 
its NOC Statoil. Unlike other oil producing governments, Norway has been successful in 
balancing state control while allowing foreign oil companies to develop key sectors of the 
industry (Falola and Genova, 2005: 207). As Falola and Genova observe, Norway recognized 
from the start that “the key to maximizing its profit control over its new industry included an 
unwavering commitment to government participation and strict regulation” (Falola and Genova, 
2005: 206).  
The goal of government participation is to encourage the development of the oil and gas 
industry without disrupting other segments of the economy. In order to ensure state interests are 
represented, the government uses Statoil to further policy objectives and to help foster economic 
growth. At the same time, Norway has allowed foreign oil companies to explore and produce oil 
in order to gain new technologies and allow private sector growth. This balance between the two 
models has been extremely successful in fostering economic development. Since the 1970s, 
Norway has maintained high growth rates, in large part due to oil and gas developments in the 
region (Noreng, 1986: 393).  
4.3.1 History of Arctic Energy Development 
 Most of Norway’s oil and gas activity is located in the Norwegian section of the North 
Sea. The oil and gas fields in this area account for over 90 percent of Norway’s total oil and gas 
production. Today these fields are showing signs of decline. Initially, North Sea oil was expected 
to peak around 2010, but the actual peak came in 2000, when the region produced 6.1 million 
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barrels per day (bpd). Current estimates suggest that by 2015, production in the North Sea will be 
cut in half to around 3 million bpd (Chen and Jaffe, 2007: 13).  
 The decline of North Sea resources is placing added pressure on Norway to resolve 
outstanding territorial disputes with Russia in the Barents Sea and on other parts of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). The maritime boundary in the Barents Sea has been a hotly 
contested issue that has spanned five decades.  A small portion of this dispute was settled in 1957 
in the Varangerfjord Agreement but the majority of the Barents Sea territory is still disputed by 
both sides (Aust, 2005: 12).  
 The Barents Sea is expected to become the next major petroleum producing region on the 
NCS. Unlike the North Sea, most of the Barents region has remained unexplored due to the 
ongoing territorial dispute with Russia. Currently, Statoil is the only company operating on the 
Norwegian side of the Barents Seas. The Barents region is becoming increasingly important not 
just for Russia and Norway but for the global oil industry as well. IOCs are looking to Norway’s 
Arctic region to replace diminishing reserves.  As Clifford Krauss suggests, “virtually every 
large international energy company is studying how eventually to win permission from Norway 
and Russia to explore in the Barents” (Krauss et al., 2005: 3).   
 IOCs first took interest of the NCS in the early 1960s. In 1962, a number of IOCs 
approached the Norwegian government in an attempt to gain drilling rights on the NCS.  At the 
time, Norwegian politicians and industry had very little experience with oil exploration and 
production (Noreng 1986: 393). The government initial role in the sector was the allocation of 
exploratory licenses, but soon took the form of direct participation through a state run oil 
company (Kashani, 2004: 1).   
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 In 1972, Statoil was created after a unanimous vote in the Storting. One of Statoil’s 
primary tasks was to promote Norwegian goods and services for use in the petroleum industry 
(Visher and Svend, 1984: 327). The state awarded Statoil preferential terms, thereby removing 
the risks associated with exploration, which ensured Statoil would survive in its early years 
(Gordon and Stenvoll, 2008: 10). Statoil received a minimum 50 percent stake in all new field 
developments. As Statoil gained technical expertise, it started operating some fields on its own. 
By the early 1980s Statoil had grown into a major competitor to IOCs on the NCS.  
Despite Statoil’s success, political support for the NOC declined in the late 1970s. 
Concerned with the growing power of Statoil in domestic affairs, the Norwegian government set 
out to limit the company’s power through the creation of the State’s Direct Financial Interest 
(SDFI). The SDFI split the ownership of Statoil into two separate parts, with one half being 
owned by Ministry of Natural Resources and the other half by the SDFI. Additionally, Statoil 
lost its right to a 50 percent share in new field developments (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2008: 11). 
By the late 1980s, Statoil no longer enjoying privileged access to the state but instead had to 
compete with IOCs and domestic producers alike.  
In April 2001, the Norwegian parliament agreed to make Statoil a publicly traded 
company and began the process of partial privatization. Political opinion on Statoil’s proposed 
privatization was mixed. Some politicians were suspicious of the proposed privatization scheme 
and preferred to have Statoil remain in state hands, while others fully supported the move to 
remove the state from the oil industry. In June 2001, 19.3 percent of Statoil shares were sold to 
the public in an initial public offering which raised US$3 billion dollars (Gordon and Stenvoll, 
2008: 17).    
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In October 2007, the company underwent further restructuring, when Statoil merged with 
the Norwegian energy company Norsk-Hyrdo, to become Statoil-Hydro. As a result of the 
merger, Statoil-Hydro became the largest international energy company operating in water 
deeper than 100 meters (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2008: 11). After its merger, Statoil-Hydro started 
an ambitious program to expand operations outside of Norway in order to reduce its dependence 
on maturing wells in the North Sea. 
Statoil-Hydro may not have to look far to replace its diminishing resource base. The 
expansion of offshore drilling in the Norwegian and Barents Seas is expected to yield major 
discoveries in the coming years. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate estimates that these two 
seas contain more than two thirds of the undiscovered resources on the NCS (Government of 
Norway, 2007: 14).  
The importance of the region is highlighted in a speech from Norway’s Foreign Minister 
stating, “The High North has always been – and will continue to be – an important part of 
Norwegian foreign policy, for both strategic and economic reasons” (Government of Norway, 
2006: 1). In 2005, the petroleum industry accounted for 25 percent of Norway’s GNP and over 
52 percent of its total exports (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2008: 16). As North Sea oil sets into 
permanent decline Norway’s claim to the Arctic will ensure Norway remains as a major exporter 
of oil in OECD world.  
4.3.2 Norway’s Energy Policy & Sovereignty 
 Over the past four decades, the Norwegian government has created a highly innovative 
energy policy, encompassing elements of both the realist and liberal approaches to energy 
development. The Norwegian approach has been highly successful in creating a strong and 
competitive oil industry on the NCS. As Gordon and Stenvoll observe, the “Norwegian policy 
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successfully combined the development of a state-owned oil company and extensive 
participation by the international oil companies (IOCs) as it sought to create an industry and 
transform the economy” (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007: 9). The role of Statoil within the 
Norwegian petroleum industry serves as an important lesson in how a petroleum policy can be 
structured to maximize the social benefits and serve the economy as a whole (Gordon and 
Stenvoll, 2007: 10). It also provides a good example of how a NOC can be used to increase state 
control and encourage economic development.    
 By directly intervening, the Norwegian government has been able to foster economic 
development. More importantly, the government has been able to direct investment to specific 
regions. Consider the Snøhvit gas development located in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. 
As part of this project a terminal was required to process the liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
produced in the field. A processing plant was constructed on Melkøya Island just off 
Hammerfest, a small town in Norway’s Far North. The project cost over US$9 billion to build 
but has brought unprecedented economic growth to the small town. The development of this 
project has created an economic boom and new optimism in Hammerfest regarding future 
economic growth (Coates et al., 2007: 153).   
The Norwegian approach has been highly successful in ensuring government interests 
and goals are achieved. As discussed previously one of Statoil’s main objectives was to ensure 
the use of Norwegian goods and services in the petroleum industry. By adopting a realist element 
into its energy policy Norway has enjoyed a number of benefits, including increased revenues in 
the form of royalties and taxes, increased employment, and the use of local materials and 
services. Statoil has consistently been used as a tool for wider development plans. Projects such 
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as Snøhvit gas field are contributing to the industrial development of the Northern region 
(Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007: 49).  
Norway’s claim to the Arctic has been strengthened through Statoil’s research and 
development programs on the NCS. As discussed previously, a multi-level approach to state 
sovereignty involving scientific research and commercial endeavors strengthens a state’s 
international legal claim.  Over the course of the last decade Statoil has undertaken specific 
research projects “aimed at developing technologies for offshore areas with cold climate and ice” 
(Gumestad et al., 2004: 3). Statoil has been successful in creating new technologies capable of 
developing fields in the icy waters of the Barents Sea. Major breakthroughs in offshore 
technology have come from pioneering projects like Statfjord (offshore oil field), Ormen Lange 
(offshore gas field), and Snøhvit (Government of Norway, 2006: 14). Through these projects, 
Statoil-hydro has developed the skills and technology necessary to successfully drill in the Arctic 
(Yenikeyeff and Krysick, 2007: 7). Statoil’s sub-sea technology developed at Ormen Lange and 
Snøhvit, including the laying of long-distance sub-sea pipelines, LNG-technology, and other 
innovations have help strengthen the governments claim to the region (Austvik, 2007: 20). More 
importantly, Statoil has contributed to the economic development of the Northern region and the 
creation of new infrastructure both on and offshore. 
Norway’s sovereignty claim in the North has been successful in large part due to the 
efforts of Statoil. In 2006 Norway submitted a claim to the CLCS in respect of areas in the Arctic 
Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. Norway’s claim was accepted by the CLCS in 
April 2009 which granted Norway over 235,000 square kilometers of ECS (UNCLOS, 2009: 3). 
This claim fell short of the North Pole by about 550 kilometers. Norway is now in the process of 
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writing the new boundaries into national law.  Statoil played a key part in making this claim 
successful by aiding the government in mapping the NCS (Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007: 32). 
 Norway is preparing for the challenges that oil and gas developments in the High North 
will bring. These new oil and gas developments differ from previous projects on the NCS as they 
have a geopolitical and foreign policy dimension (Government of Norway, 2006: 9). This foreign 
policy dimension is made explicit in the Barents 2020 report chaired by the former CEO of 
Statoil Arve Johnson:  
The foreign policy aspects of petroleum development have gained importance as energy is 
increasingly perceived and used as an instrument of power between states, particularly due 
to the shortage of energy resources. This leads to greater competition and increasing 
political interest in developing the resources in the High North. In many countries, long-
term energy security is considered to be an integral part of security policy (Government of 
Norway, 2006: 9). 
 
Norway’s High North policy, including its plans for oil and gas developments in the 
region, is articulated in the 2008 report the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy. The 
report highlights the importance of energy resources in the Arctic stating, “The resource potential 
in the North and the associated opportunities for cooperation have made energy a key dimension 
of the High North dialogues” (Government of Norway, 2007: 13). The report reiterates the 
concern that energy in the High North has acquired a foreign policy dimension, and the 
development of Arctic resources will become an international issue in years to come 
(Government of Norway, 2007: 14).   
The opening of the NCS in the high North will have a major impact on the global 
petroleum industry. Norway, which is a major oil exporter in the OECD world, will continue to 
supply Europe and North America with oil and gas supplies long after its reserves in the North 
Sea are depleted. Norway’s successful claim to the CLCS is good news for both Statoil-Hydro 
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and IOCs alike. New reserves mean new opportunities for oil companies to replace maturing oil 
fields. Although it is likely that Statoil-Hydro will win many of the new leases in the High North, 
there will likely be many opportunities for IOCs to participate. Since there is now considerable 
interest in the Norwegian North from IOCs and other private sector energy companies the need 
for direct state intervention is questionable. However, because energy in the Arctic has taken on 
a foreign policy dimension, the Norwegian government may prefer to use Statoil as a tool for 
public policy and international diplomacy.  
In short, Norway’s approach to energy is a hybrid between the liberal and realist models. 
Statoil has played an important role in the Norwegian oil and gas industry as a tool of public 
policy. The company has been instrumental in increasing government control in the North, 
encouraging economic development, and bolstering the state’s presence by developing new 
technologies for Arctic oil and gas exploration. Statoil will continue to play an important role 
improving Norway’s Arctic sovereignty, especially now as Arctic energy development has taken 
on a foreign policy dimension.  
In regards to sovereignty, Norway has directly improved both its domestic and 
international legal sovereignty by encouraging energy development in the North. Similar to 
Russia, Norway’s approach goes well beyond ensuring states security in the North but includes 
plans for economic development. Norway’s domestic sovereignty has been improved through its 
development efforts in the region which have helped raise the standard of living for its Northern 
residents. Through new energy projects, such as the Snøhvit gas field, the state has been able to 
expand its presence in the region, and perhaps more importantly has demonstrated its role as 
responsible environmental steward. Although this is not a factor in improving a states 
sovereignty claim, the ability to demonstrate the responsible development of energy resources 
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certainly helps to demonstrate state control. Since sovereignty is about the perception of other 
states, the responsible development of reserves goes along way to improving Westphalian 
sovereignty. Norway’s international legal sovereignty has also been improved through energy 
developments. Statoil played a large part in mapping the boundaries of the NCS which led to a 
successful claim to the CLCS. Statoil’s knowledge of the NCS helped Norway solidify its 
international boundaries and consequently its international legal sovereignty.   
4.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter examined the energy approaches adopted by Russia and Norway. For 
Russia, Arctic resources are primarily perceived as an engine for economic growth. The Russian 
approach reflects the major tenets of the realist model. The Norwegian approach is a mixed 
model encompassing elements of both the liberal and realist approaches. Norway is similar to 
Russia, viewing new energy as a means to foster growth and replace diminishing oil fields in the 
North Sea.  In both cases, NOCs are used as instrument of public policy. State controlled 
companies play an important role in fostering economic development and building new 
infrastructure. 
 The purpose of this chapter was to examine the impact of energy policy on state 
sovereignty. While there is no direct link between a realist energy policy and increased 
sovereignty there is certainly linkage. A state can increase its international legal claim by 
encouraging commercial endeavors and supporting regional development. This rationale is based 
on the ICJ ruling regarding ownership of Eastern Greenland. By incorporating elements of a 
realist approach both Norway and Russia have successfully encouraged economic development 
and the creation of new infrastructure in the Far North.  
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 Through direct intervention both countries have taken up socially beneficial projects, 
encouraged research and development, and fostered economic growth. Russian NOCs have 
played a key role in converting old military installations and equipment into commercial 
infrastructure. Similarly, Statoil has been instrumental in solidifying Norway’s claim to the 
North by creating new technologies and developing new infrastructure in the Far North. In both 
cases, state intervention has been very important in encouraging the development of energy 
projects in the North.   
 In regards to Canada, Arctic resources represent new opportunities for growth in a region 
that is scarcely populated and has little infrastructure. More importantly, the development of 
these resources will help to bolster Canada’s claim to the region. As observed in this chapter, 
direct participation in the energy industry is one means to strengthen a state sovereignty claim. A 
realist energy policy can increase state control by developing projects to encourage regional 
development. But can a state improve its sovereignty claim using strictly a liberal energy policy? 
Can the government rely solely on market forces to take up the task of building infrastructure 
and encouraging economic development? Since Canada is now in the process of opening new 
territories for exploration in its Arctic territories these questions require careful consideration. 
The next chapter will examine Canada’s approach to Arctic energy developments.
  
CHAPTER 5: 
CANADIAN ENERGY POLICY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 At the time of Confederation, the idea of building a rail line stretching for coast to coast 
served both commercial and defense purposes. The purpose of implementing a national railway 
system was to address security concerns and to foster commercial development. Beyond this, the 
establishment of a national railway served as a tangible symbol of the nation’s identity. In much 
the same way that the Canadian Pacific railway was used to define Canadian identity, Arctic 
sovereignty is being used to foster Canadian identity. It is this type of grand scale project that is 
needed in the Canadian North 
The fusion of commercial development and defense goals is essential if Canada is to 
improve its sovereignty claim. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the development of 
infrastructure that serves both defense and commercial purposes improves both interdependence 
and domestic sovereignty. Russia’s Kola Peninsula is a good case and point. Cooperation 
between Russia’s Northern Fleet and its state controlled energy companies has been instrumental 
in fostering economic development and increasing Russia’s control of the region.   
 Recall from the first chapter that small incremental steps can improve state control. In the 
case of Canada, this means something as simple as encouraging the exploration of resources in 
the region. In order for Canada to encourage Arctic energy development a number of steps must 
be taken. First, the Canadian government has to assist in the exploration of energy resources in 
the Arctic. Second, it needs to help create infrastructure for the development of these resources. 
An immediate investment in energy development will enable Canada to consolidate its claims to 
the Arctic.  
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 Investing in energy developments has a number of benefits, the most important being the 
improvement of Canada’s sovereignty claim. In order for Canada to increase its control it must 
foster economic development and the creation of new infrastructure. However, this is dependent 
on where oil and gas resources are found. This requires that the Canadian Arctic be thoroughly 
explored for energy resources. The question then, is what policy approach will encourage the 
optimal development of Arctic resources?  
 Since 1984, Canada has relied on a liberal energy policy to encourage development of its 
Northern resources. Using market forces alone has proven to be a slow process. The high cost of 
developing Arctic resources has made private energy companies reluctant to invest in the region. 
In the past, the Canadian government has stepped in to assist in the development of these 
resources. When examining the history of Canadian petroleum developments a notable pattern 
emerges. Canada has consistently invested in the development of non-conventional resources. 
The government has done so to help bridge the transition from cheaper conventional oil in the 
Western Basin to more expensive non-conventional projects.  
A good explanation for this is provided by the Canadian political economist Harold Innis. 
Innis argued that Canadian economy was based on the production of staple goods. A staple good 
is a commodity which dominates a country’s export that is relatively unprocessed (Bradford and 
Williams, 1992: 59). Canada’s staple products include wheat, flour, fish, furs, and timber. Oil 
and gas could easily be added to this list. In a staple economy, the type of economic activity 
developed in a particular region is based on the availability of resources. Resources that have a 
strong export demand are put into production. As markets and technology change, or as 
resources become exhausted, new staples are put into production (Clement, 1992: 34).  
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 The successful transformation from one staple to the next requires large scale support 
from the government. Innis argued that this factor is the primary motivation for public enterprise 
and government intervention in the Canadian economy (Pratt, 1988: 154). The Canadian NOC 
Petro-Canada provides a good illustration. The company was initially established to help ease the 
transition from lower cost oil and gas reserves in the Western Basin to the higher cost substitutes 
in the Canadian Arctic and the Atlantic coast.   
Canada’s new energy staples tend to be located in remote areas. Developing these 
projects involves substantial risk. The long lead times between exploration and commercial 
development means only the largest energy companies will be involved. It also means that the 
state will have to play a role in fostering the development of these resources. As the Canadian 
public policy scholar, Larry Pratt observes, concerning frontier energy projects“…the state out of 
necessity would be involved, if not as a direct partner, then certainly in subsidizing private 
investment” (Pratt, 1988: 176).  
 This rationale underscores the main argument of this chapter. Although Canada’s energy 
policy has shifted back and forth between the liberal and realist approaches, the government has 
consistently invested in the development of non-conventional resources. Regardless of what 
policy tools were used to invest in energy developments, Canada has supported the transition 
from conventional energy projects to frontier projects. Further, periods of increased state 
involvement have resulted in an increase in private sector participation in the development of 
non-conventional resources. 
 In regards to sovereignty, Canada needs to encourage the development Arctic of 
resources by investing in them.  The purpose of this chapter is to examine Canada’s approach to 
developing energy in the frontier areas. The chapter offers an analysis of Canada’s approach to 
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Arctic energy focusing on the role of the state in encouraging private sector investment. The 
chapter begins with the history of petroleum developments in the Canadian Arctic. The second 
section examines the policy approaches Canada has taken towards developing Northern 
resources.  The conclusion argues that if Canada is to improve its sovereignty claim through 
energy development, the government will have to act as a catalyst for private investors.  
5.2 History of Arctic Development 
Canada’s earliest Arctic energy developments took place in the North West Territories in 
the 1920s, but real interest had to wait until the 1960s. By 1968, over 3 million acres were under 
lease for oil and gas exploration in the northern territories (UNEP, 2006: 79). That same year, a 
partnership was formed between the Canadian government and the energy industry, resulting in 
the formation of Panarctic Oils. The goal of the company was to explore the Canadian Arctic 
islands and in some respects to assert Canadian sovereignty in the region (UNEP, 2006: 25).  
When Panarctic discovered the Drake Point gas field on Melville Island, other energy companies 
recognized the potential of the Canadian Arctic (McCraken et al., 2008:  1).  
Most of the significant discoveries were made in the 1970s and early 1980s. During this 
time, the Canadian government invested heavily in Arctic oil and gas exploration. Arctic 
exploration was made financially viable due to high energy prices and  generous financial and 
tax incentives offered to oil companies exploring in the Mackenzie Delta–Beaufort Sea area via 
the Canadian government’s National Energy Program (NEP) (Voutier et al., 2008: 104).  
Between the late 1960s and the late 1980s, more than 400 wells were drilled in the 
Canadian Arctic. This led to the discovery of 18 petroleum fields in the Arctic Islands and 47 in 
the Beaufort-Mackenzie area (McCraken et al., 2008:  2). During this time, Canada directly 
intervened in the oil and gas industry through a NOC. Petro-Canada was created in 1975 as 
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precursor to Trudeau government’s National Energy Program (UNEP, 2006: 80). Petro-Canada 
was created at relatively the same time Statoil was created in Norway, but served a much 
different purpose.  One of the main reasons for the creation of an NOC was to encourage the 
development of resources outside of the Western Basin in the frontier areas (Stanford, 1990: 5). 
 After the collapse in the price of oil in the mid 1980s, the Canadian Arctic was no “longer 
competitive with other investment opportunities in Canada or around the world” (Voutier et al., 
2008: 105).  The high cost of developing fields and transporting oil and gas to markets was huge 
and with low oil prices new developments were not financially viable (McCraken et al., 2008:  
1). As a result, private companies invested in other parts of Canada. By the mid-1980s virtually 
all oil and gas activities came to a halt in the Canadian Arctic as oil prices returned to pre-shock 
price levels. With the end of the National Energy Program, government incentives to explore for 
oil in the Arctic were terminated (Voutier et al., 2008: 104). After the National Energy Program 
(NEP) was dismantled, Petro-Canada was instructed to act as a commercial oil company and to 
forgo its public policy goals. This resulted in a decline in Arctic exploration in the mid-1980s 
which turned into a complete abandonment by the early 1990s.  
Throughout the 1990s, there was minimal petroleum activity in the Canadian Arctic. The 
regions infrastructure, including icebreakers, drilling platforms, and supply ships, were moved to 
other exploration frontiers (Clarke, 2000: 102). As IOCs restructured and acquired new reserves 
through acquisitions and mergers, exploration in the Canadian Arctic was largely abandoned.  
 In the late 1990s, rising oil prices created renewed exploration in the region. In August of 
2000, the Canadian government announced plans to make new lands available for exploration.  
The oil industry responded by bidding approximately C$400 million for new licenses and 
committed more than C$1 billion for new projects in the region (Beauregard-Tellier, 2008:  3-4). 
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The renewed interest of IOCs in the Canadian Arctic stems from changes in the global oil 
and gas industry. Over the course of the last decade, a number of oil producing countries have 
adopted tighter regulations on foreign participation. As discussed previously, the role of IOCs is 
being restricted in state controlled oil fields. As seen in the Russian case, IOCs are playing only a 
minor role in the development of the country’s petroleum reserves.  
For Canada this is good news. As opportunities for IOCs to gain new reserves diminish, 
investment in Arctic projects becomes more attractive. As mentioned previously, due to the high 
cost and long lead times from exploration to development only the largest companies have the 
capital and resources needed to operate in the Arctic. New Arctic reserves are likely to help IOCs 
replace diminishing reserves. However, while private energy companies may be looking to the 
Arctic to replace diminishing reserves, there is no guarantee they will invest the huge amount of 
resources needed to develop these projects. The lack of infrastructure in the Canadian North is a 
major barrier to project development. Projects that have been successful have done so with 
government support.  
5.3 Sovereignty, the State, and Energy Policy 
Canada’s approach to developing Northern resources has shifted between the liberal and 
realist models.  From the 1950s to late 1960s Canada relied solely on private companies to 
explore and produce Arctic resources. Between 1975 and 1984 Canada took a more 
interventionist approach. In 1975, Petro-Canada was created to help stimulate the development 
of non-conventional oil reserves. After 1985, while still retaining an NOC, Canada reverted back 
to a liberal energy policy. As a part of this change the Canadian government removed incentives 
to develop Arctic resources. Without added incentives and state subsidies IOCs abandoned 
   63  
  
Arctic projects in the early 90s. Graph one shows Canada’s shifts in energy policy as compared 




In reviewing the history of petroleum developments in the Canadian Arctic a notable 
pattern emerges. The greatest strides were made during periods of increased state involvement. 
The most significant progress in Arctic exploration was made between 1975 and 1984, the years 
in which Canada directly intervened in the oil and gas industry through its NOC Petro-Canada. 
Petro-Canada was created as a policy tool for the Federal government in 1975. The Company 
was created in the atmosphere of crisis which accompanied the first great oil shock, when the 
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Arab member states of OPEC cut off oil exports to the West, effectively tripling the price of oil 
within a three week period (Stanford, 1990: 3). Within Canada, this was also the time of energy 
disputes between the federal government and petroleum producing provinces, led by Alberta. 
The Federal government wanted to preserve lower domestic petroleum prices, while the oil 
producing provinces wanted to receive the OPEC-set world price (Stanford, 1990: 6).  This 
ongoing feud between the federal and provincial governments served to increase the 
government’s perceived energy insecurity.  
Although Canada had not been directly embargoed by OPEC, the government was 
pessimistic about the reliability of imported oil. Recognizing the need for a secure supply of oil, 
the government decided to place a greater reliance on domestic production.  In order to achieve 
this, the government argued that direct participation in the oil industry was required (Hays, 1991: 
21).  
Through direct participation, the Canadian government hoped to accelerate the 
development of non-conventional resources in frontier areas. This included areas in the North 
West Territories, the Arctic Islands, and offshore on the East Coast (Hays, 1990: 23). As a part 
of the company’s mandate, Petro-Canada was meant to invest in areas outside of the Western 
Basin in order to encourage private firms to explore the Arctic region and the Scotian shelf. A 
report from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives emphasizes this role: “Petro-Canada’s 
original mandate stressed responsibility to protect long term Canadian energy security through 
the development of expensive, alternative sources of oil and gas – even if this responsibility was 
exercised at the expense of the corporation’s profitability” (Stanford, 1990: 16).   
In fulfilling its role as instrument of public policy, Petro-Canada disproportionately 
invested a large amount of its expenditures on frontier exploration. Beginning in 1976, Petro-
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Canada launched an aggressive frontier exploration program in partnership with the international 
companies. The goal of this program was to determine whether the Northern Basins and the East 
Coast contained significant quantities of hydrocarbons (Pratt, 1988: 176). Petro-Canada quickly 
became the most ambitious explorer in the frontier regions of the Beaufort Sea, Mackenzie Delta, 
the Arctic Islands, and the East Coast (Stanford, 1990: 5-6). Petro-Canada contributed large sums 
of money to project feasibility studies, and research and development on frontier technologies 
(Peach, 1981: 49). An analysis of Petro-Canada’s capital expenditures on exploration after 1980 




Petro-Canada Canadian Exploration Expenditures, 1981-88 
(C$ million) 
 









Percent of Total 
Exploration 
Budget 
1981 108 34.3 207 65.7 
1982 143 27.8 371 72.2 
1983 123 17.5 581 82.5 
1984 128 17.6 601 82.4 
1985 145 24.7 442 75.3 
1986 62 20.2 245 79.8 
1987 101 71.1 41 28.9 
1988 134 81.2 31 18.8 
 
Source Data: Petro-Canada, 1989 Annual Report 
 
 
 In 1980, the Canadian government created the National Energy Program (NEP). The 
goals of the program were twofold, to achieve energy self-sufficiency and to increase Canadian 
ownership in the oil and gas industry. The program called for a steep regulated rise in domestic 
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oil prices, though they were still kept well below world levels. It instituted a generous package 
for oil and gas companies exploring in the frontier regions. In some cases private firms were 
receiving reimbursements of 100 percent of their exploration expenses (Stanford, 1990: 6).  At 
first the NEP was tremendously successful in encouraging new exploration outside of the 
Western Basin as Canadian firms rushed to take advantage of these new incentives.  
 While, the NEP won support from Eastern Canadian business interests attempting to 
enter into the energy industry, it was despised by the energy producing provinces and the 
established energy companies. With the collapse of energy prices in the early 1980s, a number of 
energy firms which borrowed heavily in the 1970s went bankrupt. Consequently, thousands of 
Westerners employed in the petroleum industry lost their jobs (Pratt, 1988: 43). An ironic result 
of the NEP was that it helped forge a consensus, from both business and government, in favor of 
energy market deregulation (Stanford, 1990: 6). This was part of a broader trend in Western 
democracies away from interventionist economic polices towards neoliberal polices which 
empathized removing the state from the economy as well as downsizing the public sector.  
 Partly due to resentment against the NEP from the West, the Mulroney government was 
elected with a strong mandate to dismantle the NEP. The Conservatives returned to power in 
1984 pledging to remove government from the oil and gas industry. In 1984, the Canadian 
government terminated the NEP. This marked a major shift in Canadian energy policy.  The 
government reverted back to a market based approach to developing Canada’s energy resources. 
As part of this move Petro-Canada’s role was substantially revised. 
  The Company’s mandate was altered by the Conservative government to focus on 
commercial success rather than public policy goals (Pratt, 1981: 152).  Petro-Canada’s initial 
mandate stressed its responsibility to ensure long-term energy security for Canadians through the 
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development of expensive non-conventional oil and gas resources.  After 1985, Petro-Canada 
acted and operated like any other private oil company. Almost immediately the company began 
shifting exploration efforts from the frontier areas to the Western Basin (Stanford, 1990: 6). At 
the time, the Government argued that the company’s public policy goals had been satisfactorily 
achieved (Government of Canada. 1990: 7).  
 Petro-Canada’s new mandate to perform as a commercial company allowed the company 
to shift exploration efforts to Western Canada.  Its exploration budget for Western Canada rose 
from C$62 million in 1986 to C$134 million by 1988.  It wasn’t until after Petro-Canada began 
to focus on commercial gains at the expense of its public policy goals, did its interest in the 
Arctic region wane (See Table 5.3). The company went from spending 79.8 percent of its total 
exploration budget on frontier exploration in 1985, to just 18.8 percent in 1988.   
 After 1985, Petro-Canada along with most of the other international oil companies 
substantially reduced Arctic exploration expenditures (Hays, 1990: 23). The high cost of 
exploration coupled with the high risk environment proved too much for these companies 
looking to make bigger profits during a period of lower oil prices.  After Petro-Canada’s partial 
privatization, the Company almost completely abandoned Arctic exploration along with its old 
mandate to stimulate private sector investment in non-conventional oil developments.  These 
mega projects required too much time and capital to attract companies looking for profitable 
returns on their investments. 
 Petro-Canada’s commercialization provides a good illustration of the problems with a 
liberal energy policy concerning non-conventional developments. The goal for private oil 
companies is to maximize profit and to minimize risk. After 1985, Petro-Canada’s operations 
reflected this priority. As the table illustrates, Petro-Canada’s exploration expenditures in the 
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frontier regions began to wind down in 1985, the same year it received a new mandate from the 
Conservative government to focus on commercial objectives rather than its public policy 
functions.   
 The problem with relying solely on market forces to develop energy resources is that the 
logic of the market dictates that cheaper conventional projects will be brought online first, while 
more expensive non-conventional projects are likely to develop slowly.  A report by the 
Congressional Research Service outlines this problem, “If the combination of price uncertainty, 
cost exposure, and technical risk are too great for private investors and lenders to absorb, 
developments of nonconventional projects will be delayed” (Pirog, 2007: 123). When these 
delays impede progress towards energy and sovereignty goals, the government is required to step 
in and assume of the risk involved in these projects.  
 In the case of Canada, there is merit to this argument. Petro-Canada fostered a number of 
partnerships that encouraged private companies to invest in projects with significant risk. 
Although Petro-Canada stopped exploring the Arctic in the early 1990s, it was initially quite 
successful in stimulating investment in the region. From 1976 to 1984, Petro-Canada’s role as 
catalyst centered on arranging public-private ventures to pursue non-conventional projects which 
were too expensive or too risky for private firms to carry out alone. Petro-Canada was able to 
lower the costs and risks to its private sector partners by assuming a considerable portion of them 
(Government of Canada, 1990: 4). 
 Between 1972 and 1978, there was a sharp decline in the amount of Arctic exploration 
undertaken by international companies.  One reason for this decline was the inability of the 
private firms to share information (Peach, 1981: 52). Companies exploring the Arctic operated 
alone or in small groups in isolation from one another.  These groups had an obvious incentive to 
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hold off on drilling until others had drilled first. If one group drilled a dry well, it provided 
valuable information to other groups exploring in the area. This prevented companies from 
coming up empty on expensive exploratory wells.  While this process was beneficial to the 
private companies operating in the Arctic, it substantially slowed exploration efforts in the region 
(Pratt, 1988: 179).  Petro-Canada attempted to counter this trend by forming partnerships with 
the international companies operating in the frontier regions.   
 Several examples illustrate the company’s success as a catalyst for frontier developments. 
In the early 1970s, the Panarctic Oil Company was actively exploring in the Arctic islands. By 
1974 its total gas discoveries amounted to approximately 15 trillion cubic feet of gas (Peach, 
1981: 51). However, after 1975 the company’s success in drilling exploratory wells declined 
dramatically.  Support for the company began to dwindle amongst the private sector partners.  
The major international companies involved in the project, including Shell and Mobil Oil, began 
to pull money out (Hnatyshyn, 1979: 39).  
 Petro-Canada stepped in to prop the company up and keep frontier exploration going. 
According to an interview with company officials “only the active participation of Petro-Canada 
kept the project going” (Hnatyshyn, 1979: 37). By 1979, Panarctic was the only company 
drilling in the Arctic islands. That year, the company successfully completed nine wells which 
led to the discovery of the White Fish gas field.   
 Petro-Canada’s disproportionately large share of the project was due to a lack of 
commitment from the private sector partners in the company.  At the beginning of the 1980, 
Petro-Canada was financing over 80 percent of Panarctic’s exploration budget. This continued 
until 1984, when Petro-Canada received a new mandate from the Federal government.  Without 
Petro-Canada’s substantial investment in the company it is likely the exploration in the Arctic 
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islands would have sharply declined or disappeared all together. Petro-Canada’s large scale 
investments in the late 1970s brought a number of international companies back to the table in 
the 1980s after significant discoveries were made.  
This trend is not unique to the Arctic Islands. As discussed previously, the development 
of non-conventional resources requires large scale government financial support and sometimes 
government participation.  In the case of Panarctic, a number of IOCs pulled money out of the 
company due to the high risk and high cost environment it operated in. Only through the support 
of Petro-Canada was the company able to continue exploring the Arctic.  
 Another example of Petro-Canada’s contribution to frontier development is on the 
Scotian Shelf. On Canada’s East Coast, exploration activities reached a peak in 1973.  Between 
1971 and 1973, the oil industry had spent in excess of C$100 million dollars exploring the 
region. Due to meager success, and the high cost of exploring the area, exploration efforts began 
to decline. As a result, most of the international companies moved their exploration efforts away 
from the East Coast and back into the Western Basin. By 1975, oil exploration activities on the 
Scotian Shelf had ceased because of discouraging results. A number of IOCs decided to farm out 
their interests in the area (Peach, 1981: 26). 
 Although only in its infancy, Petro-Canada picked up where the IOCs had left off.  In 
staying true to the company mandate to increase non-conventional oil supplies, the company 
bought out a number of leases owned by the international companies leaving the area.  Petro-
Canada along with independent producer Kaiser Resources Inc. bought in on leases near Sable 
Island held by Shell and Mobil Oil.  Petro-Canada paid 75 percent of the C$55 million cost of 
the program and held a 35 percent interest in the lease. Ultimately this led to a major gas 
discovery at the Venture well in 1979.  Referring to this discovery, Petro-Canada’s Chairman 
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Bill Hooper told the Standing Committee on Natural Resources in November 1979, “I have no 
qualms in stating unequivocally that, without the presence of Petro-Canada in the Sable Island 
area from 1976 onward, Canada would not be so close to having an economic source of natural 
gas to supply this critical energy shortage” (Peach, 1981: 27).  
 By the end of 1979, the Company had invested C$130 million in exploration funds and 
participated in over 65 percent of wells drilled. In 1979 alone, Petro-Canada spent over C$65 
million exploring the Scotian shelf, accounting for 70 percent of the total industry expenditures 
in this area (Peach, 1981: 51). In the same year, it spent another C$65 million exploring off the 
coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, amounting to 30 percent of the industry total (Peach, 
1981: 52). Petro-Canada’s exploration efforts in the region resulted in a number of significant 
discoveries.  By 1979, the international companies returned to the region. Petro-Canada officials 
believe that the upswing in exploration after 1979 can be attributed to two factors: The Frontier 
Exploration allowance awarded by the Federal government, which allowed companies to write-
off 65 percent of exploration costs, and the active participation of Petro-Canada in the region 
(Hays, 1991: 203).  
 One of Petro-Canada’s most significant discoveries in the frontier regions was the 
Hibernia well off the Grand Banks. Exploration on the North Grand Banks started in 1972. After 
eleven unsuccessful drilling attempts, the major international companies moved exploration out 
of the region (Peach, 1981: 52). By 1975 exploration in the area came to a complete halt and 
remained idle until 1978.  Petro-Canada’s exploration efforts between 1978 and 1980 resulted in 
a number of important discoveries in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore areas. After these 
discoveries the international companies returned to the region, investing C$250 million to drill 
ten wells in 1980 of which Petro-Canada directly participated in nine (Petro-Canada Product ion 
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Report, 1983: 23).  Only through direct participation was the government able to keep 
exploration activity going between 1975 and 1980. After significant discoveries were made by 
Petro-Canada, the international companies returned to the region.   
 Based on the above examples, it seems evident that due to the expensive nature of non-
conventional activities, private companies alone could not be counted on to invest in these areas 
on a large enough scale. Before Petro-Canada became active in the frontier regions, exploration 
by private firms had begun to decline due to the low success rates. Certainly Petro-Canada 
actions lowered the cost and risk associate with the uncoordinated exploration efforts that took 
place in the region prior to its participation.   
 While Petro-Canada was successful in stimulating Arctic exploration, arguably the 
government could have used financial incentives to achieve the same objective. This suggests 
that while an NOC can perform this function, it is not the only tool that could achieve this end. 
As noted previously, in a number of cases Petro-Canada’s contribution was purely financial. As 
such, the government could have just as easily directly invested in non-conventional projects 
without resulting in the need for an NOC (Peach, 1981: 49-51). This was the case before Petro-
Canada was established. The government directly invested in the Syncrude Oil Sands project, the 
Norman Wells oilfield, the Polar Gas Project, etc. It was also the case after the privatization of 
Petro-Canada when the government invested millions into the development of the Hibernia oil 
platform through the Hibernia Holding Corporation (Desrochers and Fisher, 2002: 12). 
 While direct government participation may not be required to encourage Arctic energy 
developments, government financial support certainly is. After the commercialization of Petro-
Canada and the removal of tax incentives for frontier exploration, major northern development 
proposals came to halt. Without government support exploration programs in the Mackenzie 
   73  
  
Delta and Beaufort Sea were abandoned. The last offshore well was drilled in 1989, followed by 
the last onshore well in 1991 (UNEP, 2006: 88).Without federal incentive programs, energy 
developments in the Canadian Arctic are not economically viable. The oil and gas industry was 
forced to fund new exploration entirely out of its own cash resources.  
 Canada`s turn to a liberal energy policy resulted in the complete abandonment of Arctic 
exploration. In 1985, the NEP was replaced by the market orientated Frontier Energy Policy. 
This policy created a new framework for offshore and northern exploration and development.  
Private companies could now obtain market value for their products, but lost major subsidies for 
northern and frontier exploration (Pratt, 1988: 205).  The 1985 Western Accords effectively 
ended any incentives to explore for energy in the Arctic. After the commercialization of Petro-
Canada no new policy tools were created to fill the void left when the NOCs public policy 
function were dismantled (Hays, 1991: 24). 
 A report from the Standing Committee on Energy and Natural Resources outlines this 
problem. The report suggests “there needs to be some other agency of government that can serve 
as a vehicle for Petro-Canada’s policy functions” (Hays, 1990: 15).  The report recommends that 
the government should create a new agency “whose primary function is to facilitate the 
development of Canada’s petroleum resources, working cooperatively with the private sector. 
This Crown agency should not have an operational role in competition with the private sector” 
(Hays, 1990: 16). Despite the committee’s recommendations, Canada has not created any new 
agency or policy to aid private companies exploring in the Arctic. As noted previously, this 
resulted in the complete abandonment of Arctic energy developments over the past two decades. 
 The creation of a new agency charged with the task of encouraging energy development 
in the North would go along way towards improving Canada’s control of the region. A new 
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agency could take many forms. Perhaps the easiest to implement would be an agency charged 
with the task of creating partnerships between oil producers.  In this case, the government’s role 
would be to foster partnerships and reduce the risk for private sector participants by investing in 
new projects. This was the model used for the Panarctic Oil Company. However, as noted 
previously, the Canadian government had to invest substantially more than its private sector 
partners to keep Panarctic afloat. As a result, this approach may be less effective in stimulating 
new developments.  
 Another approach is to create a new NOC charged with the task of exploring for oil and 
gas reserves in the Arctic. With this approach the government would be able to direct exploration 
efforts to specific areas. However, this would be substantially different from Canada’s previous 
NOC Petro-Canada. Petro-Canada was a fully integrated oil company, meaning it was involved 
in every aspects of the oil business from exploration and production to refining, transporting and 
marketing.  A new NOC would only need to be involved in the exploration process. By directly 
intervening, the government could act as a catalyst for private investors. The goal of this new 
agency should be to support the development of projects that are likely to encourage regional 
development. As a part of this effort, the company could create a training program for Northern 
residents to ensure they benefit directly from these projects.   
5.4 Conclusion 
 Going back to the discussion at the beginning of the chapter, investments in energy 
developments are investments in improving Canada`s sovereignty claim. The Norman Wells 
project provides a good illustration. Norman Wells is Canada’s second largest oil field. The oil 
field was developed through a public private partnership between the Government of Canada and 
Imperial Oil.  Through the creation of new infrastructure the oil development brought new job 
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opportunities to the small northern community. The development of these energy resources has 
served to increase the government control of the region through the expansion of social services. 
More importantly, the government has been able to increase its presence in the region, a vital 
component in demonstrating effective sovereignty.  In other words, by investing in energy 
projects Canada is helping to foster economic development and creation of new infrastructure.  
 The justification for government involvement in Arctic exploration and development 
centers on the argument that it is necessary to speed the development of Arctic resources. 
Arguably Canada cannot afford to wait for private companies to become sufficiently interested in 
the area. Canada’s interest in the area requires these resources be brought on line sooner rather 
than later. Cooperation between the Canadian government and the petroleum industry is required 
if Canada can improve its sovereignty claim. However, it does not necessarily follow that 
Canada needs to adopt a realist approach to developing arctic energy. 
 By intervening in the oil and gas industry the government could act as a catalyst in the 
frontier areas by stimulating private sector investments. This intervention does not necessarily 
require the government to be a direct participant as is the case in Norway and Russia.  In the past 
Canada has used an NOC as a policy vehicle to stimulate Arctic energy developments, however, 
since Petro-Canada’s contribution was primarily financial the government could have just as 
easily invested in new developments with private sector participants without having to rely on an 
NOC. In short, the success of a liberal energy policy in improving Canadian Arctic sovereignty 
is dependent upon the level of financial support private energy companies receive for Arctic 
projects.  
 In order to improve Canada’s sovereignty claim Canada needs to assist private 
companies in developing Arctic resources.  Direct intervention may not be required but the 
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government will have to support new developments either by directly investing in or through 
some other form of state subsidy. In doing so, Canada can improve its sovereignty claim in the 
Arctic. Given Canada’s modest financial means, the creation of a new agency charged with the 
task of encouraging petroleum developments seems well suited. Avoiding assigning an 
operational role to a new agency would avoid conflicting with Canada’s commitment to free 
market principles (Hays, 1990: 16). This approach would have the added advantage of increasing 






 Canadian Arctic sovereignty has become once again a matter of political importance. 
Over the past several decades, Canada has taken a number of steps that have helped solidify its 
claim to the region. However, none of these actions have increased the level of control exercised 
by the Federal government in the region. As discussed previously, the requirements and 
perception of sovereignty change over time but the ability to demonstrate control can serve to 
improve domestic and interdependence sovereignty, which in turn can alter the perception of 
other states and increase Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. 
 As it has in the past, Canada is turning to defense spending to help improve its 
sovereignty in the region. Over the past several years, Prime Minister Harper has announced a 
series of new military expenditures in order to respond to the anticipated sovereignty challenges 
(Lakenbauer, 2008: 2).  These measures include the development of a high Arctic base, funding 
for naval ice breakers, and the strengthening of the Canadian Rangers. While these measures 
certainly help to strengthen Canada’s sovereignty claim, they are not likely to fulfill all of the 
necessary requirements of sovereignty.  
This thesis identified three areas of sovereignty interest: control, infrastructure, and 
economic development. These three areas are closely related to one another. By building 
infrastructure and encouraging economic development the Canadian government can increase 
both its control and authority in the North. This in turn, will enhance Canada’s ability to assert its 
sovereignty in the Arctic. In order to improve its control of the region, Canada needs to adopt a 
broader approach to sovereignty which centers on improving domestic sovereignty.  This 
approach should include state support for economic development and the building of new 
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infrastructure for commercial use. Energy development offers the Canadian government one way 
to improve the three areas of sovereignty interest. However, improving these areas will require 
large scale investment from both levels of government in the Canadian North, and the private 
sector. 
Money spent on improving Canada’s control of the North should be considered an 
investment. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that 25 percent of the 
world’s remaining oil reserves are located in the Arctic (USGS, 2008: 2-3). Not all of this is 
located in the Canadian Arctic but it demonstrates the potential of the region. Over the next 
decade demand for oil is expected to surge. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
that the demand for oil will continue to grow between 0.5 to 2 percent per year over the 10 years 
(IEA Oil Supply Security 2007). What this means for Canada is that money spent on protecting 
Canadian sovereignty is likely be returned and thus should be considered as an investment. 
Energy developments will not only assist in economic development but will provide new sources 
of revenue for the federal and territorial governments.  
 This thesis argued that government intervention is required to develop working 
partnerships amongst Canadian oil producers in order to bolster Canada’s claim to the region.  
The social value of exploration in the Arctic exceeds its private value because these activities 
will bolster Canada’s claim to the region. In other words, investing in Arctic energy will not only 
help solidify Canada’s claim to the region, it will also contribute to the economic development of 
the region. Whatever pathway the government takes, either realist of liberal, the government will 
have to provide financial support in order to foster Arctic energy development. Canada has 
consistently invested in the development of non-conventional resources. The government has 
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done so to help bridge the transition from cheaper conventional oil in the Western Basin to more 
expensive non-conventional projects.  
In the past, Canada has used a wide range of financial incentives and policy tools to aid in 
the development of Arctic energy sources. Returning to the question of whether a liberal energy 
policy can improve Canada’s sovereignty claim, there is no direct answer. Perhaps the strongest 
argument supporting a liberal energy policy is that the private companies are very effective, in 
terms of efficiency and productivity, in finding and developing new oil resources (Pirog, 2007: 
16). However, because these companies are ultimately responsible to shareholders they generally 
pursue projects which have a potential to earn profit in a shorter time frame. As previously 
discussed, non-conventional projects have long lead times and are substantially more expensive 
to develop. When the risk becomes too great for private investors, these projects are ultimately 
delayed or simply abandoned.  
 This is reflective of developments in the Canadian Arctic. After the dismantling of the 
NEP and commercialization of Petro-Canada the government no longer offered support for 
Northern energy developments. Consequently, private companies lost interest in the region. 
Without state support Arctic energy development was no longer economical. As previously 
discussed, periods of increased state involvement resulted in an increase in private sector 
participation in non-conventional energy projects. Even before Petro-Canada was created, the 
government supported the private companies operating in the region by investing in them.  
 Any form of economic development, whether undertaken by the state or private 
companies, can ultimately increase the government’s control of the region. However, since one 
of the main requirements of effective legal sovereignty is increasing the states presence in the 
region, private developments are not able to improve Canada’s claim in this regard.  Private 
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sector developments are more likely to improve Canada’s domestic sovereignty by increasing the 
government’s control of the region. Here again, the Norman Wells development provides a good 
example. Although the Norman Wells oil field is operated solely by Imperial Oil, a portion of it 
is owned by the Federal government. The development of this project has resulted in 
considerable economic growth in this small community. Both the federal and territorial 
governments have collected tax revenues from this project, of which a part has been used to 
expand social services in the community. Additionally, new infrastructure has been built to 
accommodate the operation of this field. All of these actions combined have served to increase 
the government’s control of the region and ultimately have improved Canada’s domestic 
sovereignty. However, there are not enough of these of developments in the Canadian Arctic to 
make a significant contribution to improving Canada’s sovereignty claim. In other words, while 
private energy developments can help improve Canada’s control, they are not done on a large 
enough scale to significantly improve Canada’s claim to the region.   This is perhaps the 
strongest argument as to why Canada should adopt a realist approach to Arctic energy 
development. 
 While there is no direct link between a realist energy policy and increased sovereignty 
there is certainly linkage. A state can increase its international legal claim by encouraging 
commercial endeavors and supporting regional development. This rationale is based on the ICJ 
ruling regarding ownership of Eastern Greenland. By incorporating elements of a realist 
approach both Norway and Russia have successfully encouraged economic development and the 
creation of new infrastructure in the Far North.  
 Through direct intervention both countries have taken up socially beneficial projects, 
encouraged research and development, and fostered economic growth. Russian NOCs have 
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played a key role in converting old military installations and equipment into commercial 
infrastructure. They have also played an important role in mapping the RCS for new resources. 
Similarly, Statoil has been instrumental in solidifying Norway’s claim to the North by creating 
new technologies and developing new infrastructure in the Far North. In both cases state 
intervention has been very important in encouraging the development of energy projects in the 
North.  Table 6.1 outlines how the policy approaches have impacted state sovereignty. As the 
table demonstrates, the use of NOCs has been instrumental in improving domestic and 
international legal sovereignty in Russia and Norway.  Canada should create a similar policy tool 
for encouraging the development of its Arctic resources.  
In order to improve its sovereignty claim Canada needs to assist private companies in 
developing Arctic resources.  Direct intervention may not be required but the government will 
have to support new developments either by directly investing in them or through some other 
form of state subsidy. However, by directly participating in the Arctic energy developments the 
government is able to direct spending in specific areas and regions much more effectively than 
fiscal measures alone. Additionally, the government and the public learn about the risks and 
opportunities involved in Arctic exploration from its practical experience as a direct partner. 
Perhaps most importantly, direct government intervention can create new investment 
opportunities for private oil companies in Arctic projects. Especially in the case of small 
independent producers which might otherwise be excluded from Arctic projects due to their 
small size relative to foreign controlled companies. None of these goals could be guaranteed by 
the activities of private firms and government financial support alone. 
 
 




Comparing Energy Approaches 
 
Sovereignty  Canada: Liberal Norway: Mixed Russia: Realist 
Domestic  Improved through 
small projects such 
as Norman Wells. 
Not on a large 
enough scale to 
substantially 
improve domestic 
control or increase 
the government’s 









economic growth.  
Improved through the 
conversion of military 
ports into commercial 
centers used for 
energy development. 
State control has 
increased through the 
development of 
resources on RCS.  
Interdependence  No impact on this 
type of sovereignty. 
No impact on this type 
of sovereignty. 
No impact on this 
type of sovereignty.  
International 
Legal  
Very little impact 
on the perception of 
other states. No 
new developments 
have taken place 
since the late 
1980s. Projects to 
expensive to 
develop without 
state support.  
Improved through 
Statoil’s research and 
development programs 
in the Barents Sea as 
well as its role as a 
responsible steward of 
the environment. The 
state has been able to 
expand its presence 
through projects like 
Snøhvit. 
Strengthened through 
energy projects on the 
RCS that have 
increased the state’s 
presence in the 
region. New 
infrastructure has 
been build to 
accommodate these 
projects.  
Westphalian   No impact on this 
type of sovereignty. 
No impact on this type 
of sovereignty. 
No impact on this 
type of sovereignty. 
 
Canada needs to create a new agency to pick up where Petro-Canada left off. One of 
Petro-Canada’s primary goals was to act as a catalyst for private investors. However, after the 
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privatization of Petro-Canada, no new institutions were created to take on the public policy 
functions formally performed by the Company. The loss of government support coupled with a 
decline in world energy prices resulted in a loss of private sector interest in the region.   
By directly intervening in the oil and gas industry the government could act as a catalyst 
in the frontier areas by stimulating private sector investments. The Japanese National Oil 
Corporation provides a good illustration. The role of the company is to initiate offshore projects 
before there is economic justification to do so. In doing so, the government encourages the 
development of energy projects when private investors are unwilling to take the risk.   
Adopting a realist policy would represent a significant departure from the last two 
decades of Canadian energy policy which has centered on privatization and deregulation. 
However, this is not such a radical change as to be politically impossible to implement. The 
policy approach advocated in this thesis is far more benign than it would appear on the surface. 
The style of intervention advocated in this paper would be substantially different from Canada’s 
previous excursion into the oil and gas business. The government’s role would be extremely 
limited. The government would only act as a facilitator between private investors to support the 
development of resources in the North. This would only require the temporary participation of 
the government. The adoption of an interventionist energy policy would be transitional in nature. 
Once the private sector becomes sufficiently interested in the region the government could 
gradually cease supporting exploration efforts in the region.  
There are, however, other considerations that may affect the implementation of this 
strategy. For one, supporting Northern energy developments could stir regional resentment in 
Canada.  Providing subsidies and other types of government support for Northern energy 
development could potentially encourage companies to move money out of other non-
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conventional projects such as the Alberta oil sands. A second consideration is how government 
intervention in the energy industry would affect relations with the United States. It’s possible the 
United States may no look favorably upon direct state intervention. These issues are beyond the 
scope of this thesis but would require thorough examination before Canada could adopt the 
policy advocated in this paper.  
In short, Canada’s Arctic resources are high cost and high risk. A government 
organization could take the lead in promoting their development. The government could limit the 
role of a new organization solely to stimulating industry, moving on when stimulation is no 
longer required. In other words, the government should start developing energy projects in the 
North that the private sector is unwilling to take up alone. Once the private sector is sufficiently 
interested, the government could then move on to other areas. In doing so both the government 
and the private sector will benefit. The creation of a new agency charged with the task of 
encouraging petroleum developments in the Arctic would help Canada improve its sovereignty 
claim.  
Energy developments offer a cost effective way to bring economic development to the 
region. By encouraging the exploration and development of Canada’s Arctic resources the 
government can improve its control of the region. This control would strengthen domestic 
sovereignty and overtime could improve Canada’s standing on international legal sovereignty. 
While energy developments cannot fulfill all of the requirements of sovereignty, it offers a good 
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